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BACK TO THE FUTURE FOR THE POLLUTION-
EXCLUSION CLAUSE?: MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
V. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pollution-exclusion clause found in the standard Compre-
hensive General Liability (CGL) policy has produced an immense
quantity of litigation since the provision's adoption.' The coverage
limitation represented an attempt by insurers to limit their exposure
to claims arising out of environmentally-related property damages.2
In July of 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co.,3 an
opinion which constituted the high court's first opportunity to
interpret the pollution-exclusion clause. This comment seeks to un-
derstand the relationship between Morton and previous judicial
readings of the pollution exclusion, and to assess the probable
future impact of the case on the insurance industry
II. BACKGROUND: MORTON V GAIC
A. The Factual History: Polluting Activity at Berry's Creek
Beginning in 1929 and continuing until 1960, F W Berk &
Company (Berk) operated a mercury-processing plant on a forty-
acre parcel of land to the west of Berry's Creek, an estuary of
New Jersey's Hackensack River The Berk plant routinely dis-
1. See Broadwell Realty Servs.. Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 86
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("Even when considered within the context of our liti-
gious society, it can fairly be said that the [pollution] exclusion has generated an extraor-
dinary number of lawsuits."), overruled by Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co.,
629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
2. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
3. 629 A.2d 831 (NJ. 1993).
4. Id. at 838-39.
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charged cooling water containing solid mercury compounds into a
private sewer which led to an open ditch approximately 1200 feet
from the processing facility.5 Effluent from the open ditch was in
turn released into Berry's Creek at a point roughly 2500 feet from
the plant. In 1956, subsequent to an inspection conducted by the
New Jersey Health Department, Berk officials were notified that
the material being discharged from the plant contained a prohibi-
tively high level of dangerous pollutants! By 1958, Berk had
made no progress toward elimination of the problem and, respond-
ing to pressure from public health engineers, the company agreed
to pursue a four-point remediation plan.' Nevertheless, as of March
17, 1959, it was clear that Berk's efforts to rectify its violative dis-
charges had been negligible.'
In 1960, another State Department of Health investigation
reiterated earlier admonitions that the waste being released from the
Berk plant was "'unacceptable for discharge into Berry's
Creek,"'''t and again called upon the company to hasten its efforts
to institute a waste treatment process." In view of Berk's four-
year pattern of inaction in the face of official orders to establish
palliative measures, the Department also threatened legal action
should the company continue to ignore its responsibilities. Later
that year, the assets and property of Berk were sold to Velsicol
5. Id. at 839.
6. Id.
7. Id. State Health Department inspectors had found that the Berk plant utilized ap-
proximately 60,000 gallons of water each day, roughly 90% of which was used for cool-
ing purposes. Id. Industrial wastes produced by the plant were comprised primarily of
cooling water containing a high solid content of insoluble dimethylcithiocarbonates. which
are organic and inorganic mercury compounds. Id. Although wastes from the Berk plant
were passed through a sedimentation tank where settled solids were recovered and repro-
cessed before discharge into the private sewer, public health engineers at Berry's Creek
nevertheless determined that the released effluent contained a prohibitively high level of
suspended solids. Id. The engineers also concluded that the settling tank which serviced
effluent from one of the three buildings producing waste at the Berk plant was too small.
Id.
8. Id. On December 2, 1958, public health engineer John Wilford warned Berk's vice-
president that "as this matter has [sic] been brought to [his] attention over two years ago,
this department has a right to expect some appreciable progress toward the elimination of
this problem." Id. (second alteration in original).
9. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 839 (NJ. 1993).
On this date, public health engineer John Wilford noted that Berk was "'cognizant' that
its wastes contained mercury compounds which had to be removed." Id.
10. Id. at 840 (quoting the Department of Health inspection report).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Chemical Co. (Velsicol) and the company was re-named Wood-
Ridge Chemical Corp. (Wood-Ridge). 3 However, the personnel
structure and the primary production processes of the plant re-
mained unchanged. 4
Shortly after the sale, a small lagoon was excavated behind
the industrial premises now owned by Velsicol. As before, the
lagoon eventually flowed into Berry's Creek, but the receptacle
served as another settling tank which retained effluent for an addi-
tional two days.' 5 In 1964, viewing the lagoon as a mere tempo-
rary measure, the Department of Health once again urged plant
officials to apprise the State of its treatment program status.' 6 Al-
though Wood Ridge subsequently exhibited some willingness to
expedite the installment of an acceptable treatment system at the
plant in cooperation with the State Health Department, no apprecia-
ble success was achieved. 7 By 1970, 'the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had become embroiled in the company's
problems. In 1971, the plant was sold to Ventron Corporation
(Ventron) which in turn sold the processing facility tract to Robert
and Rita Wolf three years later. With the mercury-laden effluent
fiasco still unresolved,"8 development activity by the Wolfs caused
13. Id. Prior to the sale, Berk was aware that the municipal sewer system would be
incapable of handling the plant's wastes, even if pretreatment procedures were employed.
Id. However, a letter from Berk to the Department of Health represented that the compa-
ny was seeking '"professional help on design of a treatment plant."' Id.
14. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 840 (NJ. 1993).
Velsicol had been informed of the results of the Department of Health's various Berry's
Creek inspections. Subsequent to the onset of operations under Wood-Ridge ownership,
settling remained the sole means of waste treatment employed by the plant, but company
officials now assured Health Department officials that Wood-Ridge intended to develop its
own methods of treatment. Id
15. Id.
16. Id. at 841. In connection with February, 1964 correspondence between Wood-Ridge
and the Department of Health, the State complained to the company that it had received
no engineering studies or treatment facility proposals. Id. Wood-Ridge was requested to
inform the State of the progress of its treatment program status and when a treatment
facility would ultimately be completed. Id.
17. Id. In order to expedite its siting of a treatment facility, Wood-Ridge hired Clinton
Bogert Associates, a Consulting Engineer firm. Clinton Bogert prepared a report on behalf
of Wood-Ridge which recommended a general design for the proposed treatment facilities
and established minimum effluent requirements. On August 5. 1964, officials from Wood-
Ridge and the Health Department agreed that the company would submit final plans for
the treatment facilities within the next few weeks. Id. On November 2, 1964, Wood-Ridge
informed the Department of Health that final plans for the treatment plant could be com-
pleted by March 31, 1965. Id. By March 31, 1966, despite repeated inquiries by the
Health Department, a treatment facility for the Wood-Ridge plant had not even been de-
signed. Id.
18. Id. at 842. During its tenure as owner of the Berry's Creek site, and in response
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
additional pollution problems which eventually resulted in a suit by
the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) against Ventron,
Velsicol, Wood-Ridge and Berk.
B. The Procedural History
In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
Ventron Corp.,9 the DEP sought to compel the past owners of
the processing-plant tract to bear the various remediation costs
associated with the clean-up of Berry's Creek. The court imposed
strict liability on all defendants based on common law theories, and
further rendered judgment for joint and several liability under the
New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act of 1977 (Spill
Act)." Finally, a judgment previously entered on a cross-claim
asserted by Robert and Rita Wolf based on Ventron's fraudulent
non-disclosure regarding mercury contamination on the land was
affirmed."' At the inception of the Ventron suit, insurers for the
various owners and operators of the Berry's Creek processing plant
disavowed coverage, thus forcing Ventron to provide its own de-
fense. After the DEP-initiated litigation, as Ventron's successor in
interest, Morton International, Inc. (Morton) brought a declaratory
judgment action against the various insurers of the processing
plant.2 Thus, in Morton International v. General Accident Insur-
ance Co.,' Morton sought reimbursement for costs incurred in
defending the Ventron suit and the Wolf cross-claim, plus indem-
nity for the clean-up and remediation expenses stemming from the
DEP action.24
C. The Insurance History
The primary comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance
coverage held by Morton's predecessors at the Berry's Creek site
was provided by General Accident Insurance Co. (General Acci-
to an investigation by the Federal Water Quality Administration (F.W.Q.A.), Ventron ap-
proved capital expenditures for improved effluent treatment. The document ratifying the
outlays characterized the company's effluent predicament as "currently at an emergency
level", id. at 841, and acknowledged that "'Ventron has already suffered adverse publicity
because of alleged mercury discharges, and we will certainly receive more if we do not
institute controls approved by the F.W.Q.A."' Id. at 841-42.
19. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
20. Id. at 157-64. See generally N.J.S.A. §§ 58:10-23.11 - 23.11z (1977).
21. 468 A.2d at 166-67.
22. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 835 (NJ. 1993).
23. 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
24. Id. at 835.
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dent) from October of 1960 until October 1971. However, the
various policy forms used by the insurer varied considerably over
the eleven-year period.
Beginning October 1960 and continuing until October 10,
1964, General Accident provided liability coverage on the process-
ing facility for property damage encompassing ".all sums which the
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay ... for damages
because of injury to or destruction of property ... caused by
accident.' ' '"s The policy left the term "accident" undefined, and
conceded coverage only as to "'occurrences or accidents which
happen during the policy period.'
' '16
Effective October 10, 1964, General Accident amended the
previous form of the policy by replacing the phrase "caused by
accident" with "'resulting from an occurrence."'7 The endorse-
ment supplied the following definition of "occurrence":
The word "occurrence" as used in this endorsement means
an unexpected event or happening which results in injury
to or destruction of tangible property during the policy pe-
riod, or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions
which result in injury to or destruction of tangible property
during the policy period provided the insured did not in-
tend or anticipate that injury to or destruction of property
would result. 28
On October 1, 1966, and continuing through October of 1971,
General Accident redefined "occurrence" as: "'[A]n accident, in-
cluding injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."'' 9
While the Berry's Creek plant was owned by Ventron during
the period ranging from October 10, 1971 to June of 1972, the
Morton court noted that the source of the corporation's comprehen-
sive general liability coverage for this interval was unknown. How-
ever, the trial record indicated that CGL coverage was provided by
Reserve Insurance Company (Reserve) from June 14, 1972 through
25. Id. at 835-36 (omissions in original) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 836.
27. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 836 (N.J. 1993)
(emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the effective General Accident policy).
29. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the effective General Accident policy).
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January 1, 1975. The applicable coverage was evidenced by three
policies issued by Reserve, each promising to indemnify the in-
sured against "'all sums which the Insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of property damage .. .
caused by an occurrence.""'3 The definition of "occurrence" under
the Reserve polices was essentially identical to that established in
the General Accident policies in effect from 1966 to 1971. How-
ever, several paragraphs after the "occurrence" coverage limitation,
the Reserve policies for the June 14, 1973 to June 14, 1975 period
also included a."pollution-exclusion clause" which stated:
This insurance does not apply ... (f) to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land,
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.3'
On January 1, 1975, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Lib-
erty Mutual) assumed primary CGL coverage for Ventron until Jan-
uary 1, 1977. The scope of the Liberty Mutual policies included
"'all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of ... property damage ... caused by an
occurrence,"' 32 with "occurrence" defined as "'an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results
in . . . property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured ... The Liberty Mutual polices
also bound the insured to the standard pollution-exclusion clause.
III. THE MORTON OPINION
After a brief discussion regarding prior adjudications of the
case, 34 the Morton court quickly rejected the defendant insurers'
argument that the undefined "as damages" language in CGL poli-
cies should not be construed to include response costs imposed to
30. Id. (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting the effective Reserve policy).
31. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the effective Reserve policy).
32. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 836 (NJ. 1993)
(omissions in original) (quoting the effective Liberty Mutual policy).
33. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting the effective Liberty Mutual policy).
34. See id. at 834-35.
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remediate environmental damage.35 With this preliminary issue
rather summarily set aside, the court proceeded to consider the
proper judicial construction of the standard pollution-exclusion
clause.
A. The Adoption of the Pollution-Exclusion Clause
Writing for a unanimous majority, Justice Stein began the
assessment of Morton's claims by examining the events and cir-
cumstances which surrounded the insurance industry's adoption of
the standard pollution-exclusion clause. Prior to 1966, Justice Stein
noted, CGL policies generally provided liability coverage for bodily
injury and property damage "caused by accident."36 Although "ac-
cident" was undefined in the policy language, most jurisdictions
accepted a general rule which interpreted the term to include harm
caused by ongoing events that inflicted injury over an extended
period of time, so long as the injury was neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.37 Likewise, when the
insurance industry replaced the previous "accident-based" CGL
policy with an "occurrence-based" approach in 1966,"8 the new
language was generally accepted as covering "'pollution liability
that arose from gradual losses."'3 9 Indeed, the occurrence-based
policy first promulgated in 1966 largely represented a codification
of the "unexpected and unintended" standard which had character-
ized judicial construction of the accident-based policy.
A short time subsequent to the adoption of the occurrence-
based policy, the Morton court observed, the insurance industry be-
came cognizant of the potential for a substantial future increase in
the number of claims for environmentally-related losses.' Conse-
quently, industry drafting organizations initiated the process of de-
veloping and securing regulatory approval for what would become
35. Id. at 843-47.
36. Id. at 849.
37. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 849 (NJ. 1993);
see also E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Look-
ing Glass, 74 GEo. LJ. 1237, 1246 (1986) ("Most courts . . . extended coverage to pol-
lution related losses that occurred over periods of months or years [under accident-based
policies].").
38. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
39. 629 A.2d at 849 (quoting Rosenkranz, supra note 37, at 1247).
40. Id. at 849-50; see also Rosenkranz, supra note 37, at 1251 ("The insurer's primary
concern was that the occurrence-based policies, drafted before large scale industrial pollu-
tion attracted wide public attention, seemed tailor-made to extend coverage to most pollu-
tion situations.").
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known as the standard CGL pollution-exclusion clause.4" However,
Justice Stein quickly identified a vast discrepancy between the
drastic limiting effect on CGL coverage suggested by the literal
language of the pollution-exclusion clause and the relatively minor
impact on coverage which the insurance industry had represented to
insurance regulators would occur as a result of adopting the
clause.42 With the historical context of the coverage exception
firmly established,43 the Morton court turned to an analysis of the
diverse array of judicial interpretations which had been imposed
upon the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollution-exclu-
sion clause since its industry-wide acceptance.
1. New Jersey Case Law
Justice Stein's comprehensive explication of the case law deal-
41. See supra text accompanying note 31.
42. The Morton court noted that, when the Insurance Rating Board (IRB) and the
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB) began to seek state regulatory approval for the
addition of the pollution-exclusion clause to standard CGL policies, these agencies had
submitted an explanatory memorandum. The memorandum supporting adoption of the pol-
lution-exclusion clause read, in part: "Coverage for pollution or contamination is not pro-
vided in most cases under present policies because the damages can be said to be expect-
ed or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The above [pollu-
tion] exclusion clarifies this situation so as to avoid any question of intent." Nancy
Ballard & Peter Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General
Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 610, 625-26 (1990) (quoting the IRB's
memorandum to the New Jersey Insurance Commission seeking regulatory approval of the
pollution-exclusion clause).
However, the court had already observed that prior occurrence-based policies broadly
"covered property damage from gradual pollution and[, unlike the pollution-exclusion
clause, see supra text accompanying note 31,] imposed no restriction on the 'suddenness'
of the pollutant discharge." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831,
852 (N.J. 1993). As a result, the court found the first sentence of the language quoted
above from the IRB's explanatory memorandum to be "simply untrue." Id. Moreover,
since the pollution-exclusion clause was viewed as an attempt by the insurance industry to
exclude "all coverage for unintentional pollution damage except for that caused by sudden
and accidental discharges," id., the Morton court felt that the characterization of "so mon-
umental a reduction in coverage as one that 'clarifies this situation' simply is indefensi-
ble." Id. at 852-53.
Justice Stein then summarized the critical functional relationship between prior occur-
rence-based policies and the plain language of the pollution-exclusion clause: "[U]nder the
occurrence-based policy, coverage was afforded if the property damage was accidental;
under the pollution-exclusion clause, even if the property damage is accidental, no cover-
age is afforded unless the discharge of pollutants is both sudden and accidental." Id. at
853. Therefore, the court opined, "[tihe memorandum utterly obscures that distinction, and
the conclusion is virtually inescapable that the memorandum's lack of clarity was deliber-
ate." Id.
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:265
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ing with past constructions of the pollution-exclusion clause began
with an overview of the relevant New Jersey decisions. The New
Jersey approach was found to be characterized to a considerable
extent by a 1987 Appellate case, Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co.' In Broadwell, the court held that the
pollution-exclusion clause was ambiguous, and thus should be
construed against the insurer.45 Moreover, the Broadwell decision
asserted that the coverage provided by the clause would be deemed
to be coextensive with, and essentially a recapitulation of, the
coverage afforded by the policy term "occurrence."" Therefore,
Broadwell held, to the extent that environmental damages in any
given case could be properly viewed as failing within the CGL
policy definition of "occurrence," i.e., to the extent that the "prop-
erty damage [was] neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of the insured,"47 the pollution-exclusion clause would not
serve as a bar to coverage in New Jersey.48
44. 528 A.2d 76 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
45. Id. at 86. The idea that ambiguous language in adhesion contracts should be con-
strued against the person who selected the phrasing is commonly termed "contra profer-
entum" and is well-rooted in the corpus of insurance law. For cases applying the "contra
proferentum" doctrine in an insurance context, see Oritani Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1993); Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972
F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993); Carey Canada, Inc. v.
Columbia Casualty Co., 940 F.2d 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Northbrook Excess & Surplus
Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1991); Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1974); Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D. N.J.
1993); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. .1334 (D. NJ. 1992); Boland v.
King County Medical Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Saah v. Contel
Corp., 780 F. Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1991), aft'd, 978 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1992); Phillips v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 1991), afftd, 978 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1992); French American Banking Corp. v. Rota Mercante Grancolumbiana, 752 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 925 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1991); Alfin, Inc. v. Pacific Ins.
Co., 735 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Murray Ohio Mfg. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
705 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. I11. 1989); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 670 F.
Supp. 630 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Dronge v. Monarch Ins. Co., 511 F. Supp. I (D. Kan.
1979).
46. 528 A.2d at 86.
47. See supra text accompanying note 29.
48. New Jersey's interpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause evolved rather quickly.
In 1975, the Superior Court, Law Division, first addressed the significance of the clause
in Lansco, Inc. v. DEP, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aft'd, 368 A.2d
363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). In Lansco, the insured was an oil company which
had been forced to incur considerable expense in cleaning up a discharge of oil into New
Jersey's Hackensack River. The pollution was caused by vandals who had opened the
valves on oil storage tanks, hence allowing the release of approximately 14,000 gallons of
oil. Id. at 521. The court found that the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollu-
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2. Decisions from Other Jurisdictions
After reviewing a plethora of federal and state decisions ad-
dressing the issue of proper pollution-exclusion clause interpreta-
tion, the Morton court discerned two distinct judicial trends which
clearly delineated the opinions discussed.49 First, the court noted
that one group of decisions read the pollution-exclusion clause as
denying coverage for property damage "resulting from the dis-
charge of pollutants over a sustained period ... ."" Justice Stein
tion-exclusion clause, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, was satisfied so long as
"the oil spill was neither expected nor intended ...." Id. at 524. Since the court had
determined that Lansco had neither expected nor intended the release of the oil, the pollu-
tion-exclusion clause did not bar the insured's coverage. Id.
The New Jersey courts did not have another opportunity to construe the pollution-
exclusion clause until seven years later in Jackson Township Mun. Utilities Auth. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). In Jack-
son, the insured was a local utility authority which sought to compel its insurer to indem-
nify and defend against claims arising from the seepage of pollutants from the Authority's
landfill into a nearby aquifer. Id. at 991. The Jackson case solidified the New Jersey
interpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause, holding that the coverage exception was
ambiguous and must be read to serve as a mere restatement of the coverage limits im-
posed by the CGL policy definition of "occurrence." Id. at 994. This approach appeared
to have been derived from the statement of a legal commentator that the pollution-exclu-
sion clause only bars coverage "for damages arising out of pollution or contamination
where such damages appear to be expected or intended on the part of the insured ... "
3 ROWLAND H. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, App. 58 (1988). Thus, since the
insured could not be found to have expected or intended the damage caused, neither the
"occurrence" clause nor the pollution-exclusion clause precluded coverage. Jackson, 451
A.2d at 994-95. The Jackson approach to pollution-exclusion clause interpretation was
subsequently affirmed by the New Jersey Appellate courts in the Broadwell case. 528
A.2d at 86.
For cases explicitly adopting the Broadivell interpretation of the pollution-exclusion
clause, see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 77 (1st
Cir. 1992); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d
Cir. 1991); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp.
1139 (W.D. Mich.), vacated, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3560 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Pepper's
Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla.
1987); Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Hecla Mining Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty
Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (II1. 1989);
International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (Il1. 1988); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,
477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1980); Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wash. 1990).
49. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 870-71 (N.J. 1993).
50. Id. at 857. However, the court conjectured that, since the polluting activity by the
insureds in many of these cases appeared to have been rather willful and flagrant, cover-
age might also have been denied on the theory that the ultimate damage was neither
unexpected nor unintended, i.e., did not result from an "occurrence." Id.
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further found that courts adhering to this first general category of
reasoning generally barred coverage either on the grounds that the
"sudden" language of the exclusion clause involved a temporal
implication (meaning abrupt or instantaneous), 5t or on the basis of
a blunt determination that discharges of pollutants over a prolonged
period could not be properly viewed as "sudden and accidental." 2
Therefore, the Morton court concluded, courts were considerably
more likely to ignore the questionable regulatory history of the
pollution-exclusion clause53 and to construe the term "sudden"
more restrictively in cases wherein the insured had intentionally
discharged known pollutants on a regular basis over an extended
period of time.
Second, the Morton court identified a separate pollution-exclu-
sion clause interpretive tendency, prevalent among a variety of both
state and federal courts, which had manifested itself in cases evinc-
ing a decidedly lesser degree of culpability on the part of the
insured with respect to polluting activity.54 In these cases, opined
Justice Stein, courts had avoided the prophylactic effect of the
pollution-exclusion clause either by refusing to construe "sudden"
as imparting a temporal connotation similar to "abrupt," or by
determining that the word "sudden" or the phrase "sudden and
accidental" was ambiguous and to be construed against the insur-
er.
55
C. The Pollution-Exclusion Clause: The Morton Interpretation
Prior to announcing the new standard which would control
interpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause in New Jersey, the
Morton court engaged in a brief plain language analysis of the
coverage exception. In this regard, the court implicitly referred to
an earlier portion of the opinion in which it had explicitly over-
ruled the Broadwell application of the exclusion clause:56
We overrule the Appellate Division's decision in
Broadwell, supra, to the extent that it holds that the stan-
dard pollution-exclusion clause should be understood mere-
ly to impose the same conditions on coverage as are im-
51. See id. at 857-62.
52. See id.
53. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 862 (NJ. 1993).
55. See id. at 862-70.
56. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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posed by the definition of "occurrence," which focuses on
whether the ultimate damage was expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured."
Indeed, Justice Stein had previously noted that the "sudden and
accidental" language in the exclusion clause was clearly intended
by the drafters to modify and limit the sort of "discharge, dispers-
al, release or escape" of pollutants for which coverage is afforded,
not the damage caused by the pollutants.58 Thus, the Morton court
was convinced that the term "sudden," as used in the standard
pollution-exclusion clause, possessed a distinctly temporal
element.5 9 Consequently, a "sudden" event- was viewed as one
which "begins abruptly or without prior notice or warning,"' al-
though the actual duration of the event was deemed "not necessari-
ly relevant to whether the inception of the event is sudden."61 As
a result, and conceding that the meaning of "accidental" was gener-
ally understood, the Morton court concluded that the phrase
"sudden and accidental" in the standard pollution-exclusion clause
"describes only those discharges, dispersals, releases, and escapes
of pollutants that occur abruptly or unexpectedly and are unintend-
ed. 62
However, the court then proceeded to draw a stark contrast
between the broad scope of coverage previously afforded under
occurrence-based CGL policies,63 which covered even continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions so long as the property damage
was not intended or expected from the standpoint of the insured,
and the highly restrictive terms of coverage suggested by the plain
language of the pollution-exclusion clause,' which "eliminate[d]
all coverage for unintended pollution-caused damage that the occur-
rence-based policy had provided, except for the unusual 'boom-
event' type case in which the discharge of the pollutants was both
sudden-meaning abrupt-and accidental."'6
All at once, invoking the court's earlier discussion regarding
57. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 847 (NJ. 1993).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. l
63. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying note 31.
65. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 853 (NJ. 1993)
(emphasis omitted).
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the perceived bad faith through which the insurance industry had
obtained adoption of the pollution-exclusion clause from state regu-
lators,' Justice Stein announced that he intended to render moot
the previous "plain language"'67 and "jurisdictional interpreta-
tion"'  analyses which he had taken such great pains to advance:
The critical issue is whether the courts of this state should
give effect to the literal meaning of an exclusionary clause
that materially and dramatically reduces the coverage previ-
ously available for property damage caused by pollution,
under circumstances in which the approval of the
exclusionary clause by state regulatory authorities was
induced by the insurance industry's [misrepresentations]."69
Justice Stein's inquiry proved emphatically rhetorical. The
Morton court found that to afford the insurance industry the benefit
of the plain language of the pollution-exclusion clause would sanc-
tion misrepresentation and flout public policy "requiring regulatory
approval of standard industry-wide policy forms to assure fairness
in rates and in policy content .. ". ."" Accordingly, the court as-
serted that it would construe the pollution-exclusion clause in a
manner consistent with the reasonable expectations7' of the state
regulatory authorities from whom the insurance industry had pro-
cured ratification of the clause.72 Therefore, the Morton court held,
66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
69. 629 A.2d at 872.
70. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 848 (NJ. 1993).
71. The doctrine of "reasonable expectations" is a widely-used mode of judicial insur-
ance policy interpretation which generally holds that: "The objectively reasonable expecta-
tions of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negat-
ed those expectations." Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970); see, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419
P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) (applying the "reasonable expectations" principle to oblige insurer to
defend, despite "intentional harm" policy exclusion, insured who physically assaulted an-
other); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 328 (NJ. 1966) (using the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine to provide homeowner with coverage for injuries sustained by a
residential employee despite the presence of a policy exclusion specifically denying cover-
age for the damages); see also ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§ 25D (1987).
72. 629 A.2d at 874-75. Earlier in the opinion, the Morton court had detailed the
gross misrepresentation attendant to the insurance industry's campaign to secure approval
of the addition of the pollution-exclusion clause to the standard CGL policy in New Jer-
sey and elsewhere. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The court also had noted
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it would "construe and give effect to the standard pollution-exclu-
sion clause only to the extent that it shall preclude coverage for
pollution-caused property damage caused by an 'occurrence' if the
insured intentionally discharged, dispersed, released or caused the
escape of a known pollutant."73 Subject only to the exception of
this new standard, coverage provided by the pollution-exclusion
clause in New Jersey would remain coextensive with that which
had been afforded under prior occurrence-based policies.' By an-
nouncing the new test, and consistent with its earlier overruling of
Broadwell," the Morton court refused to view the limits on cover-
age imposed by the pollution-exclusion clause as a mere re-
statement of the traditional definition of "occurrence" found in
standard CGL policies.76
D. Defining "Occurrence"
The next task facing the court required a determination of the
relevant factors to be assessed in deciding whether a particular
incidence of environmentally-related property damage constituted an
"occurrence" within the meaning of the standard CGL policy. Re-
call from previous discussions that the existence of an insurable
"occurrence" is a prerequisite to coverage and is definitionally
contingent upon whether the particular property damage at issue
was either expected or intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured.77
Justice Stein initially acknowledged the impracticality of apply-
ing a subjective test in order to determine whether the insured in a
given case had intended or expected injury to result from his activ-
ities.7" Absent "'smoking gun' testimony from a disgruntled em-
that the industry's representation of the exclusion to state regulators "constituted virtually
the only opportunity for arms-length bargaining by interests adverse to the industry,
insureds having virtually no choice at all but to purchase the standard CGL policy." 629
A.2d at 848. Therefore, the Morton court concluded, had insurers been forthcoming about
the true effect on coverage which was intended to result from the language of the pollu-
tion-exclusion clause, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, "a significant rate re-
duction would have been required." 629 A.2d at 872. Consequently, in accord with the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, see supra note 71, the court arrived at its ultimate
interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause, see infra note 73.
73. 629 A.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
75. See supra text accompanying note 57.
76. Id. at 875.
77. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
78. 629 A.2d at 879.
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ployee,"'79 Stein reasoned, even insureds conceding their intentional
discharge of known pollutants would be able to successfully elicit
a finding of coverage under a subjective "occurrence" test merely
by insisting on a lack of expectation and intent with respect to the
resultant harm.8" Therefore, some form of objective evaluation was
necessary. However, the court was unpersuaded that expectation or
intent to cause damage should be simply presumed as a matter of
law on the basis of a knowing discharge of pollutants. 8' Instead,
the Morton court again took a new approach and advanced a list
of factors which were to guide a case-by-case factual analysis
aimed at objectively establishing an insured's expectation and intent
to injure. These factors included: the duration of the discharges, the
degree of culpability associated with the discharges (whether inten-
tional, negligent, or innocent), the quality of the insured's knowl-
edge concerning the deleterious aspects of the pollutants involved,
the existence of any attempts by regulatory authorities to halt or
curtail the insured's activities, and the presence of subjective
knowledge on the part of the insured regarding the possibility or
likelihood of harm. 2
E. Old Facts Meet New Law
Turning at last to an application of its newly-announced pollu-
tion-exclusion clause interpretation, 3 the court determined that
Morton was not entitled to indemnification for the remediation
costs imposed on its predecessors in previous litigation.' Quite
simply, the court had little difficulty finding that prior operators at
the Berry's Creek plant had intentionally discharged known pollut-
ants in direct contravention of the Morton court's nascent exclusion
clause standardY The holding was convincingly supported by a
brief review of the facts and circumstances attendant to the almost
four-decade pattern of evasive action exhibited by Morton's ante-
cedents in the face of repeated Health Department warnings. 6 In
the Morton court's view, prior operators at the Berry's Creek facil-
ity had been explicitly informed of the unacceptable level of pol-
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Id. at 879-80.
82. Id. at 880.
83. See supra text accompanying note 73.
84. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
85. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 880 (N.J. 1993).
86. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
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lutants contained in the plant's effluent on several occasions."
However, despite this clear knowledge, previous plant owners had
nevertheless regularly and intentionally continued to discharge the
harmful materials while ignoring the repeated demands of State
officials to remedy the situation." As a result, Morton was denied
recovery under those policies featuring a pollution-exclusion clause
which had ostensibly covered the past offending parties.89
Finally, the court addressed the "occurrence" language found in
each of the policies held by Morton's predecessors. As indicated
above, the disposition of this issue turned on the factors which had
been identified by the Morton court as germane to a determination
of an insured's expectation or intent to cause damage.' Citing
now-familiar facts, the Morton court issued its ultimate holding:
Without determining that such damage was intended, we
find inescapable the conclusion that [the] damage ... must
have been anticipated by Morton's predecessors on the
basis of their prolonged knowledge of and avoidance of
compliance with complaints by regulatory officials that the
company was discharging unacceptable emissions, including
mercury compounds, into Berry's Creek. Based on that
conclusion .... as a matter of law the property damage to
Berry's Creek and the surrounding area was not caused by
an "occurrence" within the meaning of the term in the
various CGL policies.9
Since the damage caused by the previous discharges into Berry's
Creek were found to have been at least "expected,"'92 Morton's
final bid for indemnification from the defendant insurers was un-
ambiguously foreclosed.
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF MORTON
As the preceding discussion indicates, the Morton decision is note-
worthy in at least two respects. First, the New Jersey Supreme
87. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying note 82.
91. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 884 (NJ. 1993).
92. Id. ("We are thoroughly persuaded that summary judgment was properly granted,
there being no material disputed facts concerning whether Morton's predecessors had ex-
pected to cause environmental damage to Berry's Creek and the surrounding area.").
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Court endeavored to sort through the vast array of jurisdictional
interpretations which have been applied to the standard CGL policy
term "occurrence" in order to arrive at what appears to be a rela-
tively unified and predictable approach. As we have seen, this
approach was advanced by the court in the form of a multi-fac-
tored test.93 Second, and perhaps most significantly, Morton at-
tempted to clearly define the limits of the pollution-exclusion
clause as a bar to coverage in relation to the scope of coverage
afforded under prior "occurrence-based" policies. We now proceed
to investigate the extent to which the court has succeeded in its
quest to establish a cohesive framework for the resolution of envi-
ronmental damage coverage issues. Our analysis begins with a brief
discussion regarding some fundamental mechanics of the standard
CGL policy.
A. Initial Support for the "Merger" Theory
1. Fundamentals of the CGL Policy
The reader of a standard CGL policy, reviewing the document in
order from start to finish, is first confronted with a broad coverage
clause which essentially informs the insured of his most elementary
rights to recover under the contract.' The sweeping scope of cov-
erage suggested by the language of this clause, however, contains
an implicit limitation; most modem CGL policies (including the
relevant policies involved in the Morton case) covenant to indemni-
fy the insured for "all sums [he] shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of property damage ... caused by an
occurrence."" Thus, as a quick glance at the "Definitions" section
of the policy will reveal, in order to preserve any hope of recover-
ing from his insurer, the insured must at least demonstrate that the
property damage he has caused was neither expected or intended
from his standpoint.96
However, .to the insured's utter chagrin, he soon finds that
passing muster under the definition of "occurrence" is not the end
of his battle for remuneration. Further along in the text of the CGL
policy is an "Exceptions" section which ultimately serves as a
93. See supra text accompanying note 82.
94. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying note 29.
96. See JERRY, supra note 71, § 65[d], at 337 ("Under the revised [CGL] policy ...
[t]he bodily injury or property damage must be 'caused by an occurrence.' Obviously, the
meaning of occurrence is crucial.").
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glorified exercise in "Indian giving." The "Exceptions" section
notifies the insured that the shimmering talisman of broad coverage
which he had perceived earlier in the "occurrence" clause is about
to be substantially curtailed by an alphabetical laundry list of spe-
cific coverage limitations carved from the initial mirage of almost
absolute entitlement to indemnity. It is in this section that the
insured will find the standard pollution-exclusion clause.
These complexities aside, the most salient point to be extracted
from the above diatribe is that an insured who fails to meet the
requirements of an "occurrence" need not worry about the effects
of the pollution-exclusion clause; he will not recover from his
policy in any event. On the other hand, when an insured is able to
show a lack of expectation and intent to cause injury, he must then
proceed to face scrutiny under the pollution-exclusion clause. How-
ever, recall from the sections above that, prior to Morton, the clear
tenor of New Jersey case law relegated the relevancy of the pollu-
tion-exclusion clause to a mere restatement of the coverage limits
imposed by the CGL policy term "occurrence." '97 Thus, when
Broadwell and its ilk announced that they would henceforth equate
the coverage limitations imposed by the pollution-exclusion clause
with those erected by the "occurrence" clause,98 the court gave
insureds a significant benefit by eliminating the significance of the
coverage exception altogether. In effect, the pollution-exclusion
clause was merged into the CGL "occurrence" language. As a
result, an insured who could establish that he met the definition of
"occurrence," i.e., that the damage he had caused was neither ex-
pected nor intended from his standpoint, would not be subjected to
a traumatic foray into the perilous world of the CGL "Exceptions"
section (assuming none of the enumerated exceptions in that sec-
tion other than the pollution-exclusion clause applied to the in-
sured). Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Morton court was dissat-
isfied with the liberal Broadwell reading and, after overruling the
case," laid out its new standard for pollution-exclusion clause
interpretation: the clause would be "construed to provide coverage
identical with that provided under the prior occurrence-based poli-
cy, except that the clause will be interpreted to preclude coverage
97. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 37, at 1256 ("[Many opinions have] read the
pollution exclusion and the occurrence limitation coextensively by essentially defining the
pollution exclusion out of existence.").
98. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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in cases in which the insured intentionally discharges a known
pollutant ....""
2. A Plain Language Analysis
However, at least from the perspective of a plain language analysis,
it is quite difficult to discern any meaningful distinction between
the Broadwell and Morton approaches. The average individual
would likely be hard-pressed to deny that a person who has inten-
tionally discharged a known pollutant (the Morton standard) can
also be seen to have expected, if not intended, any damages which
thereby resulted (the Broadwell standard). Indeed, both interpreta-
tions appear to require a substantial degree of culpability with
respect to both the insured's awareness that he has released materi-
als into the environment, and his cognizance of the harmful quali-
ties attendant to those materials. This point is especially pertinent
because the issue of an insured's right to demand coverage under
the CGL "occurrence" clause is essentially a question of culpabili-
ty. The terms in which the "occurrence" clause standard is cast,
whether damage was "expected or intended" from the standpoint of
the insured,10' support this proposition. Indeed, as justification for
its adoption of an objective, multi-factored test for the evaluation
of an insured's expectation or intent to cause injury in lieu of a
per se rule, the Morton court recognized that "insureds held re-
sponsible for remediation of environmental pollution vary signifi-
cantly in their degree of culpability for the harm caused by pollut-
ant discharges.""1 2 Viewed in this light, the proper function of the
"occurrence" clause can be seen as an attempt to preclude coverage
for at least those insureds which evince the highest possible degree
of culpability with respect to polluting activity. For without this
limiting effect, the "occurrence" clause serves no apparent purpose.
Therefore, the question arises: What sort of polluting activity can
be deemed the "most culpable?"
In jurisdictions like New Jersey where the applicable "occur-
rence" analysis obviates the need to establish the insured's subjec-
tive expectation or intent to injure in order to bar coverage, 3 the
answer to out inquiry appears quite obvious. Logic, and indeed the
100. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 875 (N.J. 1993)
(emphasis added).
101. Id. at 836 (quoting the effective General Accident policy).
102. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
103. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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very nature of an act of pollution, dictate that an insured's ulti-
mate, objective culpability with respect to polluting activity in any
instance is contingent solely upon two simple elements: (1) the
degree of intent held by the insured regarding his actual act of
releasing the pollutants, and (2) the degree to which the insured
was aware that the materials he discharged were capable of causing
damage, i.e., the degree to which the insured was aware that the
materials he discharged were actual "pollutants."'" Truly, it is
impossible to imagine a more blatant incidence of polluting activity
than that in which the insured, with full knowledge of the harmful
effects a particular substance can have on the environment, never-
theless willfully and intentionally releases that substance into a
body of water or tract of land not specifically designed for waste
disposal. In light of the foregoing, it appears that from a logical
standpoint the Morton "occurrence" analysis should indisputably bar
coverage for insureds who intentionally discharge known pollutants.
3. Some Perspective for the Plain Language Analysis
Notwithstanding, these observations are rendered just short of use-
less, for, as every first-year law student soon learns, the law often
has little use for plain language. In the courtroom, the meaning
attributed to words usually has more to do with stare decisis and
rules of construction than Noah Webster. Thus, if the true impact
of the Morton court's new pollution-exclusion clause standard is to
be fully appreciated, one must identify when, if ever, damages
caused by an insured who has intentionally discharged a known
pollutant can be found to be neither expected nor intended. Stated
differently, we must compare the application of the pollution-ex-
clusion standard to the type of factual elements which, when pres-
ent, will elicit a judicial finding of expectation or intent to cause
damage. For our purposes, the task of identifying these factors is
quite simple, given that the Morton decision explicitly adopted a
new test for deciding whether an insured has objectively expected
or intended to cause injury. Reviewing briefly, the relevant factors
104. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
105. The phenomenon of courts disregarding the plain language of contracts between
two parties has become especially prevalent in the insurance context. See Kenneth S.
Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L. 399, 408
(1987) ("[J]udicial interpretations of policy provisions governing whether there was an
,occurrence' within the meaning of a policy, [and] ... the applicability of the 'pollution
exclusion,' . . . have produced coverage obligations which insurers had not anticipated.").
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include:
[1] [The duration of the discharges, [2] whether the dis-
charges occurred intentionally, negligently, or innocently,
[3] the quality of the insured's knowledge concerning the
harmful propensities of the pollutants, [4] whether regulato-
ry authorities attempted to discourage or prevent the
insured's conduct, and [5] the existence of subjective
knowledge concerning the possibility or likelihood of
harm.10
6
Even the most cursory examination of these new "occurrence"'
factors reveals that two of the considerations, italicized above,"cc
essentially constitute a precise restatement of the new Morton pol-
lution-exclusion clause standard."03 Therefore, since we can safely
assume that the Morton court did not intend to advance a new in-
terpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause which would be forev-
er rendered moot, we can hold the court to an implied ruling that
the intentional discharge of a known pollutant by an insured, ab-
sent additional affirmative findings with regard to the remaining
three "occurrence" factors (discharges of an extended duration,
intervention of regulatory officials, and subjective knowledge held
by the insured regarding possibility or likelihood of harm), cannot
be deemed activity sufficient to establish the expectation or intent
to cause damage under the CGL "occurrence" clause. Truly, if
every insured who intentionally discharges known pollutants can
also be seen to have expected or intended the resultant damages in
a legal sense, isn't the only substantive post-Morton inquiry still,
as it was under Broadwell,1° the threshold CGL policy question
of whether the insured expected or intended to cause damages
through his discharges of harmful materials? Is not the Morton
pollution-exclusion standard again robbed of any substantive inde-
pendent significance and "merged" into the definition of "occur-
rence?" Nevertheless, a reading of the Morton "occurrence" analy-
sis which fails to bar coverage for the "mere" intentional discharge
of known pollutants in violation of the second and third Morton
"occurrence" factors yields strange and irrational results. In typical
law school fashion, the point will be illustrated through use of
106. 629 A.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
107. See supra text accompanying note 106.
108. See supra text accompanying note 100.
109. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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hypotheticals." °
B. A Dissection of the Morton "Occurrence" Test
1. The Significance of the "Duration of Discharge" Factor
Imagine an insured who, on one occasion alone, intentionally
discharges a substance known by him to be a pollutant. Assume
that our insured had never previously intentionally discharged a
known pollutant, and had never been contacted by any state or
federal regulatory official in connection with polluting activity.
Further assume that no subjective evidence exists which would es-
tablish the insured's violation of the fifth "occurrence" factor. This
insured fails the two Morton "occurrence" factors which coincide
with the Morton .pollution-exclusion standard,"1 but does not fall
any of the remaining three. Therefore, the insured's polluting activ-
ity, activity which we have previously identified as "fully culpa-
ble,""' must nevertheless pass muster under the Morton "occur-
110. The arguments advanced in the ensuing section will become quite involved. A brief
recapitulation is helpful at this point. The Morton pollution-exclusion clause standard bars
coverage for those insureds who intentionally discharge known pollutants. See supra note
100 and accompanying text. However, before a court has reason to reach the pollution
exclusion issue, it must first decide that the insured's activity constitutes an "occurrence"
within the meaning of the standard COL policy. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying
text. The Morton court established a five-factor test for evaluating the "occurrence' issue,
which focuses on whether the damage caused by the insured was expected or intended
from his standpoint. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. The second and third
factors of the Morton "occurrence" test, like the Morton pollution-exclusion standard,
militate against a finding of an "occurrence," and hence against a finding of coverage, for
insureds intentionally discharging known pollutants. See supra notes 106-08 and accompa-
nying text. Nevertheless, the Morton "occurrence" test also contains three other factors.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Therefore, the reader is advised to bear in
mind that the ultimate object of the following discussions is to determine whether a viola-
tion of just the two "occurrence" factors which coincide with the Morton pollution-exclu-
sion clause standard can be viewed as sufficient to bar coverage under the "occurrence"
clause. If so, the issue raised by the Morton pollution-exclusion clause inquiry will always
be resolved under the Morton "occurrence" analysis, and the former standard will be
effectively "merged" into the latter. This "merger" theory is the interpretation favored by
the author.
Consequently, when the text refers to the two "fundamental" "occurrence" factors, the
reference is to the second and third factors which parallel the Morton pollution-exclusion
clause standard, a standard which speaks to the insured who has intentionally discharged
known pollutants. Therefore, references to the "two fundamental occurrence factors", the
"second and third 'occurrence' factors", and the "pollution-exclusion clause standard" all
should be read as dealing with the same basic situation in which an insured has intention-
ally discharged a known pollutant.
111. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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rence" test. A holding to the contrary would amount to judicial
admission that the mere intentional discharge of a known pollutant
is sufficient to bar coverage under the "occurrence" test, and hence
that the pollution-exclusion standard has no substantive independent
significance.
Now suppose that our insured has intentionally discharged
known pollutants over a prolonged period of time. This time, three
of the five Morton "occurrence" factors militate against a finding
that the insured did not expect nor intend the damage he has
caused: two which coincide with the pollution-exclusion standard,
and one which focuses on the duration of the discharges. Under
this scenario, a court can safely deny the insured coverage under
the Morton "occurrence" test"' without admitting the substantive
irrelevance of the pollution-exclusion clause standard. This is be-
cause of the presence of a third "occurrence" factor which at least
ostensibly serves to differentiate between the evidence necessary to
establish an insured's expectation or intent to injure and the evi-
dence necessary to foreclose coverage under the pollution-exclusion
standard.
However, does it make sense that an insured who has "merely"
intentionally discharged a known pollutant should be deemed not to
have objectively expected or intended the harm he has caused, but
an insured who has intentionally discharged known pollutants over
a prolonged period of time should be deemed to have objectively
expected or intended damage? Suppose a man, A, intentionally
introduces a known poison into his wife's drink one night at dinner
in an amount which A knows to be capable of harming the human
body in some manner. As a result of A's actions, his wife becomes
very ill and requires one week of hospitalization and medical treat-
ment. Now suppose that another man, B, introduces an equivalent
amount of the same known poison into his wife's drink. B's wife
also becomes very ill and recovers after a week in the hospital.
However, B continues to poison his wife's drink periodically over
a period of months. Consequently, B's wife not only ultimately
sustains cumulative injuries more serious than those of A's wife,
but also requires substantially more hospitalization and medical
attention. B can certainly not be said to have expected or intended
the damage he has caused to a greater extent than A simply be-
cause he poisoned his wife more frequently than A. Although B
113. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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has caused more damage than A, both men can be seen' to have
held the same level of expectation or intent to injure even though
the amount of damage each actually caused is different."
4
Why is this so? The third Morton "occurrence" factor inquires
as to "the quality of the insured's knowledge concerning the harm-
ful propensities of the pollutants."".. However, Webster's Dictio-
nary defines "pollutant" as "a harmful chemical or waste material
discharged into the water or atmosphere."".6 Obviously, the con-
cept of harm is inextricably woven into the very essence of the
term "pollutant"; a pollutant without "harmful propensities" is no
pollutant at all. Therefore, an insured who intentionally discharges,
even once, a substance known by him to have harmful propensities
(to be a "pollutant") cannot later be heard to deny objective expec-
tation regarding whatever damages are eventually caused by the
substance he knew to be capable of causing harm." 7 By analogy,
a one-time intentional discharger of a known pollutant into Berry's
Creek may cause a small amount of damage which necessitates a
brief and relatively inexpensive clean-up operation by the DEP. On
the other hand, a frequent intentional discharger of the same known
pollutants into Berry's Creek may cause massive damages warrant-
ing a very costly and time-consuming DEP remedial campaign.
Both insureds intended to discharge substances, and both insureds
knew that the substances discharged were capable of causing envi-
ronmental damage, i.e., were "pollutants." The one-time flagrant
polluter objectively expects to cause damage, although he may
arguably expect to cause minor damage. Likewise, the frequent fla-
grant polluter also objectively expects to cause damage, although
he may arguably expect to cause more damage than the one-time
114. Of course, a one-time intentional discharger of a known pollutant may release
substances of such a quantity or of such a nature that he should expect to cause damage
equivalent to or greater than that expected by a frequent intentional discharger of a
known pollutant. For our purposes, assume that the one-time polluter discharges a sub-
stance of a given quantity and the frequent polluter discharges the same substance in the
same amount, albeit on many occasions.
115. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 880 (NJ. 1993)
(emphasis added).
116. WEBSTER'S NE W WORLD DICrIONARY 1103 (2d College ed. 1986) (emphasis add-
ed).
117. The point should be rather clear. Assess the logic of the following statement: "I
admit that I intentionally discharged a substance on one occasion, and I further admit that
I knew the substance discharged had the capacity to cause environmental harm at the time
of discharge. However, I had no reason to expect that damage would result from my
discharge."
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polluter. In each instance the culpability, the objective expectation
or intent of the insureds with regard to the relative respective de-
grees of damages actually caused, is constant."'
2. The Significance of the "Regulatory Intervention" Factor
Furthermore, assume that a hypothetical insured has intentional-
ly discharged known pollutants over a prolonged period of time,
and has also been previously warned on several occasions by state
regulatory authorities that the materials he is discharging are caus-
ing damage to the environment. Now four of the five Morton
118. However, this is not to suggest that an objective finding of an insured's expecta-
tion or intent to cause damage is or should be contingent upon a subjectively-perceived
recognition by the insured that the specific substances discharged, given the precise quan-
tities released, would or were likely to yield the level of damages actually caused. While
logic dictates that greater degrees of damages should generally be expected by the insured
as the duration and frequency of his discharges of known pollutants increases, the insured
cannot disclaim expectation or intent to injure on the grounds that, while he knew the
substances released were capable of causing environmental damage, he did not expect the
extent of the damages which actually resulted from his actions.
The adoption of an objective test to evaluate insured expectation or intent to cause
damage necessarily entails a recognition that, at some point; the acts of an insured speak
for themselves and the insured should not be able to escape the consequences of those
acts due to a deficiency in the available subjective evidence. See supra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text. Thus, the need to subjectively establish actual culpability is supplanted
by a more pragmatic and realistic approach. Once the intentional discharger of a known
pollutant is permitted to deny expectation or intent to injure because he did not anticipate
the level of damages ultimately caused, the entire rationale supporting the use of an ob-
jective test is undermined. Indeed, proof or disproof of an insured's asserted lack of ex-
pectation or intent as to the damage actually caused is very nearly impossible; a court
must either take the insured at his decidedly biased word, or, as an objective test de-
mands, refuse to turn a blind eye to the inevitable consequences which result from inten-
tional misdeeds. Truly, an objective "occurrence" analysis recognizes that "[i]nsurers under-
take to indemnify insureds against unknown risks of harm. They do not undertake to
indemnify against losses within the insured's control and of which the insured is aware."
Thomas A. Gordon & Roger Westendorf, Liability Coverage for Toxic Tort, Hazardous
Waste Disposal and Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 567, 592-93 (1988-89).
Moreover, no person can predict with certainty what harm will stem from the release of
toxins. Ecosystems are unpredictable, and the insured who willfully pollutes must be
deemed to have assumed and understood the risks inherent in a volatile environment.
In fact, several pre-Morton courts have explicitly dismissed the significance of an
insured's actual expectation or intent with respect to the precise level of damages caused
when evaluating the "occurrence" issue. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Industri-
al. Lab. Corp., 883 F.2d 1092, 1098 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[IThe crucial question [is] whether
any injury was intended, not whether the intent was 'to cause the precise magnitude of
the injuries sustained."'); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
609 A.2d 440, 463 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("Perhaps [the insured] was not
aware of the exact extent of the dangerous consequences emanating from its polluting
activity. However, we cannot ignore reality by accepting the blithe assurance of [the in-
sured] that it did not intend to injure others.").
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"occurrence" factors sound squarely against the insured and a find-
ing of his objective expectation or intent to cause damage is pre-
sumably inevitable. Moreover, here the court can easily deny cov-
erage under the Morton "occurrence" test with absolutely no fear
of relegating the pollution-exclusion standard to a position of irrele-
vance. This is due to the affirmative findings regarding two "occur-
rence" factors other than those which parallel the pollution-exclu-
sion standard. Again, these factors nominally serve to differentiate
between the evidence necessary to establish an insured's expecta-
tion or intent to injure and the evidence necessary to foreclose
coverage under the pollution-exclusion standard.
However, it is again difficult to see why this insured should be
deemed to have expected or intended the injury he has caused to
any greater degree than the insured in our original hypothetical
who "merely" intentionally discharged a known pollutant. Returning
to the unsavory world of misogyny, recall the example of B, the
frequent and flagrant wife-poisoner. Suppose now that after two or
three poisonings, B's wife becomes suspicious and calls the police.
The police are appalled at B's behavior, but have better things to
do. However, they do warn B that they know what he has done,
and threaten to arrest him if he poisons Mrs. B again. Undaunted,
B proceeds to poison his wife several more times, and each time
the police simply reiterate their initial warning."9 Does B now,
because of the police warnings, expect or intend the damage to his
wife to a greater degree than did our old friend A, who intention-
ally introduced a known poison into his wife's drink on only one
occasion and was never confronted by the police? No. Unlike the
frequency of discharge factor discussed above,2 ' the police warn-
ings do not even have the potential to affect the extent of the
damage expected or intended. B did not need the police to tell him
that the substance he was intentionally putting in his wife's drink
was harmful. Like A, B knew of the poison's potential to adverse-
ly effect the human body at the outset. Thus, whether in the con-
text of an insured who has intentionally discharged a known pol-
119. This scenario closely parallels the facts of the Morton case. Despite years of eva-
sive activity by Morton's predecessors at Berry's Creek, see supra notes 4-19 and accom-
panying text, New Jersey Health Department officials apparently declined to invoke any
concrete means of ensuring compliance with environmental regulations. Indeed, the Morton
court noted that: "[W]e might fault the Department of Health officials for not acting on
threats to institute enforcement proceedings ...." 629 A.2d at 882.
120. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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lutant only once (A), or an insured who has done so on several
occasions (B), warnings by state or federal regulatory officials have
absolutely no impact on the insured's expectation or intent to in-
jure. Although such warnings may provide a previously innocent
polluter with notice that the materials he has been discharging are
harmful to the environment, our discussions here have nothing to
do with previously innocent polluters. An insured who intentionally
discharges a substance which he knew at the time of discharge to
be capable of causing environmental damage holds the same degree
of expectation or intent to injure, with respect to each release, re-
gardless of whether he is thereafter discouraged by regulatory au-
thorities, and regardless of whether he continues to intentionally
discharge known pollutants after receiving notice from the officials.
3. The (Lack of) Significance of the "Subjective
Knowledge" Factor
As a final note, we need not consider the impact of the fifth
Morton "occurrence" factor. The third Morton "occurrence" factor
directs future courts, when determining whether the insured has
expected or intended to cause damage, to inquire as to "the quality
of the insured's knowledge concerning the harmful propensities of
the pollutants.'' Let us assume that, under the third Morton "oc-
currence" factor, a hypothetical insured has been found to have
held absolute knowledge regarding the harmful qualities of the
pollutants he has discharged. It should be noted that such a finding
is in fact redundant. Recall from earlier discussions that the con-
cept of harm is necessarily part and parcel of the term "pollut-
ant.' " Thus, assuming our hypothetical insured can also be
found to have intentionally discharged the materials under the
second Morton "occurrence" factor, a finding that he had held
absolute "knowledge concerning the harmful propensities of the
pollutants" under the second "occurrence" factor" dismisses the
need to consider the fifth Morton "occurrence" factor, which pur-
ports to necessitate an investigation into "the existence of subjec-
tive knowledge [held by the insured] concerning the possibility or
likelihood of harm."'2 It is simply not possible to intentionally
discharge a substance one knows to have harmful propensities, i.e.,
121. 629 A.2d at 880.
122. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying note 106.
124. 629 A.2d at 880.
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knows to be a "pollutant," yet still disclaim knowledge concerning
the possibility or likelihood of the resultant harm.
Whether this knowledge can be viewed as objective or, as the
fifth factor purports to require, subjective, will depend merely on
the nature of the evidence used to establish the second and third
"occurrence" factors. Thus, if only objective evidence can be iden-
tified by the court to find insured intent as to factor two and in-
sured knowledge as to factor three, the court will be unable to
establish the insured's subjective knowledge that harm was likely
to occur as the result of his discharges under factor five. However,
due to the close relationship between factor five and the second
and third factors," the court will necessarily, albeit implicitly,
have found that the insured held objective knowledge regarding the
possibility or likelihood of harm. If only subjective evidence can
be identified by the court to establish insured intent as to factor
two and insured knowledge as to factor three, the court will then
be able to convert these findings into a recognition that the insured
had also held subjective knowledge in violation of factor five.
Finally, if objective evidence can be identified by the court to
establish intent as to factor two and knowledge as to factor three
and subjective evidence can also be identified which demonstrates
violations of factors two and three, the court will necessarily have
found both objective and subjective knowledge on the part of the
insured that harm was likely to occur as a result of his discharges.
However, since factor five seeks only that evidence which estab-
lishes the insured's subjective knowledge of the possibility of
harm, the court in this instance will naturally declare that the in-
sured has violated factor five, while neglecting to explicitly men-
tion the finding of objective knowledge of the possibility of harm
which must surely follow from its partial use of objective evidence
to establish factors two and three."2
In each case, a judicial finding of insured intent as to factor
two and insured knowledge as to factor three logically yields the
conclusion that the insured had held some form of knowledge,
either objective, subjective or both, with regard to the possibility or
likelihood of harm. Factor five is violated only when subjective
evidence is used to support a finding that the insured has violated
factors two and three. Therefore, the issue raised by factor five is
125. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:265
MORTON INT'L, INC. v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INS. CO.
subsumed within, and will always be resolved by the court's eval-
uation of factors two and three; the mere fact that the Morton
court has chosen to explicitly announce the existence of insured
knowledge that harm was likely to result from his discharges only
when subjective evidence is available does not alter the basic reali-
ty that such knowledge, of whatever quality, is always realized
upon a violation of factors two and three. Consequently, a court's
finding that an insured had held "subjective knowledge concerning
the possibility or likelihood of harm"' 7 under the fifth "occur-
rence" factor adds nothing substantive to the analysis and merely
constitutes a conclusory label, a semantic encapsulization of the
impact produced by already-established findings regarding the sec-
ond and third "occurrence" factors. Although the language used in
factor five is certainly another way of enunciating the nature of the
conclusions to be drawn from perceived violations of factors two
and three, one should not fall into the trap of assuming that the
fifth "occurrence" consideration has any independent bearing on
whether an insured has expected or intended to cause injury.
Moreover, the potentially useful impact of the fifth factor on
the Morton "occurrence" analysis in cases wherein the insured
exhibits less than full culpability with respect to the second and
third "occurrence" factors is irrelevant to our discussion. Remember
that the purpose of this section is to determine whether an insured
who intentionally discharges (the second "occurrence" factor) a
known pollutant (the third "occurrence" factor), an insured who is
explicitly denied coverage under the Morton pollution-exclusion
standard,' will always nevertheless first be barred from coverage
under the threshold "occurrence" inquiry, hence resulting in the
"merger" of the pollution-exclusion standard into the "occurrence"
test. In order to arrive at our answer, we must focus merely on the
capacity of the five Morton "occurrence" factors to yield a finding
of insured expectation or intent to injure in the context of an in-
sured who displays the type of "fully culpable" polluting activity
prohibited by the pollution-exclusion clause standard. To the extent
that one or more of the "occurrence" factors has no bearing on the
outcome of this issue, it must be disregarded. Here, the fifth "oc-
currence" factor is always irrelevant where an insured has inten-
tionally discharged a known pollutant because the issue raised by
127. 629 A.2d at 880; see also supra text accompanying note 106.
128. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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that consideration will always be resolved by the court's disposition
of the second and third "occurrence" factors which, as we have
seen, coincide with both the Morton pollution-exclusion clause
standard.29 and the two fundamental elements we have identified
as together determining the ultimate culpability of an insured with
respect to polluting activity. 3
C. The "Merger" Theory Meets Morton
The preceding discussions raise an interesting question. Why is
it that, although we gradually introduce more Morton "occurrence"
factors to the basic situation in which an insured merely intention-
ally discharges a known pollutant (i.e., merely violates the two
Morton "occurrence" factors which coincide with the Morton pollu-
tion-exclusion standard), the insured's level of expectation or intent
to injure does not rise accordingly? What is the proper function of
the "extra" factors? The answer appears to be that the "duration of
discharge" and "regulatory intervention" factors simply serve as
objective facts which can be used by the court to infer the exis-
tence of the two fundamental elements which exclusively bear upon
the determination of whether an insured has expected or intended
the damage he has caused. As we have seen, these fundamental
elements are the insured's intent to discharge and his knowledge
that the substances discharged were actual pollutants.13'
Again, keep in mind that these considerations are represented
in two of the five Morton "occurrence" factors 32 and comprise
the crux of the Morton pollution-exclusion standard.'33 If the
Morton court can be found to have used the three extraneous "oc-
currence" factors as mere means to achieve the ultimate end of
establishing the insured's intentional discharge of a known pollutant
in violation of the second and third "occurrence" factors, we can
infer that the court viewed the intentional discharge of a known
pollutant as activity sufficient to bar coverage under the "occur-
rence" clause. If that is the case, our "merger" theory is support-
ed.
34
In resolving the "occurrence" issue under its new test, the court
129. See supra notes 106-08, 110 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 100-05, 110 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying note 100.
134. See supra note 110.
[Vol. 44:265
MORTON INT'L, INC. v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INS. CO.
did note that Morton's predecessors at Berry's Creek had dis-
charged pollutants over a prolonged period of time.' 35 However,
the effect of this factor upon the court's finding of an expectation
to cause damage was clearly ancillary to the import of evidence
relating to the numerous confrontations between Morton's predeces-
sors and state environmental officials. Indeed, the court used evi-
dence of the intervention of New Jersey state regulatory officials at
the Berry's Creek plant, and the subsequent evasive action exhibit-
ed by Morton's predecessors in response thereto, to infer intent to
discharge. '36 Moreover, reports sent to the Berry's Creek plant by
regulatory officials and state engineers, which both identified the
specific harmful components of the plant's effluent and detailed the
harmful effect on the environment which these components were
likely to have, were used to infer that Morton's predecessors had
knowledge that their discharges were "likely to cause harm."'37
Based on our earlier discussions, note that this second inference is
tantamount to a finding that Morton's forerunners had knowledge
that they were discharging "pollutants" in violation of the third
"occurrence" factor.'38 Since the concept of harm is necessarily
ingrained within the term "pollutant," one who knows that a partic-
ular substance is a "pollutant" also knows of its capacity to cause
harm. 39 Therefore, one who intentionally discharges a "pollutant"
must have knowledge that the release is "likely to cause harm."'4
Thus, the important point to derived from the court's analysis is
that evidence pertaining to the "regulatory intervention" factor was
deemed significant only insofar as it tended to inferentially estab-
lish the existence of what the court clearly felt to be the most
important "occurrence" factors: intent to discharge (the second
factor) and knowledge that the substances discharged were harmful,
i.e., were actual "pollutants" (the third factor).'4 ' Such a circu-
135. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 882 (N.J. 1993).
136. Id. ("The conclusion is inescapable that from . . . when the unacceptable quality of
its emissions first was brought to Berk's attention, the discharges of pollutants thereafter
occurred intentionally. The intentional nature of the discharges is confirmed by [the] . . .
continued evasion of . . compliance with the repeated demands by Department of Health
engineers . . . 2').
137. Id. ("Knowledge that its discharges were likely to cause harm was also inferable
from the regular reports submitted and demands for compliance asserted by state engi-
neers, which Berk and Wood Ridge consistently ignored.").
138. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
140. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 882 (N.J. 1993).
141. This assertion is amply supported by the following observation of Judge Havey in
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itous use of evidence relating to regulatory intervention should not
prove surprising. Indeed, the warnings of authoritative officials are
relevant to an insured's intent or expectation to injure only in that
such admonitions generally tend to serve notice to the chastised
party that he is engaging in illegal or destructive activities. Consis-
tent with our earlier conclusions, then, at least one of the "extra,"
non-fundamental "occurrence" factors was used by the Morton
court merely as a vehicle to establish the two fundamental elements
of insured culpability.
Turning to the fifth "occurrence" factor, the reports and de-
mands for compliance issued by state officials, the evasive action
exhibited by Morton's predecessors, and the correspondence from
state officials to the prior owners, which outlined the deleterious
substances in the effluent discharged by the Berry's Creek plant
and the harmful effect a release of those materials was likely to
have, were also used by the court to infer subjective knowledge
"that environmental harm was an inevitable result of its discharg-
es."'42 However, as discussed at length earlier,143 the court's
finding of subjective knowledge under the fifth "occurrence" factor
adds nothing of substance to the resolution of the expectation or
intent to injure issue, and proves purely redundant in view of its
previous assessment of the second and third factors. This assertion
is supported by the fact that the court used the same objective
facts (the correspondence between Morton's predecessors and state
officials, evasive conduct, etc.) to establish the fifth factor as it had
previously used to infer violations of factors two and three.'"
Finally, the Morton court also noted that other documents
existed which actually appeared to subjectively establish that prior
plant owners knew "that environmental damage inevitably would
occur if its untreated effluent continued to flow into Berry [sic]
Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990,
994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982): "The industry, for example, which is put on notice
that its emissions are a potential hazard to the environment and who [sic] continues those
emissions is an active polluter excluded from coverage." (emphasis added)
142. 629 A.2d at 883 ("Berk's subjective knowledge that environmental harm was an
inevitable result of its discharges was fairly inferable as early as the mid-1950s.").
143. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text. Moreover, the inference of subjec-
tive knowledge from objective facts, see supra text accompanying note 142, raises doubts
even as to whether the Morton court was warranted in finding a violation of the fifth
"occurrence" factor. The court's logical progression in effect concedes that what it labels
as "subjective knowledge" is in fact knowledge deduced through inference (itself an objec-
tive process) and based on objective facts.
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Creek."'45 The most damning of these records was a Wood-Ridge
inter-company memorandum which acknowledged that: "[W]e are
under a moral obligation, as well as an impending legal one, to
effectively control the mercury effluent from our processes."'
46
Again, however, recalling our prior analysis of the fifth "occur-
rence" factor, 47 it is clear that any subjective evidence used by
the court to establish the insured's violation of the fifth factor
could just as easily have been used to establish the same knowl-
edge that harm was likely to occur under factors two and three. In
fact, the language of the memorandum is, within the context of the
third "occurrence" factor, clearly capable of demonstrating that
Morton's predecessors held "knowledge concerning the harmful
propensities of the pollutants."'48 Moreover, according to the Mor-
ton court, the existence of such knowledge permits an inference of
intent to discharge under the second "occurrence" factor: 'The
conclusion is inescapable that from ... when the unacceptable
quality of its emissions was first brought to [the insured's] atten-
tion, the discharges of pollutants thereafter occurred intentional-
ly."'49 Therefore, although the subjective evidence relating to the
inter-company memorandum was certainly relevant to issue of
whether Morton's predecessors expected or intended injury, the
analysis of this evidence under the rubric of the fifth "occurrence"
factor yielded precisely the same conclusion as would have been
reached through an analysis of the evidence under factors two and
three. As a result, the court's reliance on the fifth factor was un-
necessary and added nothing of import to the court's resolution of
the "occurrence" issue.
In sum, through a careful dissection of the Morton court's
"occurrence" test, we have encountered no reasonable justification
for allowing an insured who has "merely" intentionally discharged
a known pollutant in violation of the two fundamental "occurrence"
factors to claim a lack of expectation or intent to injure.50 This
conclusion has gained support from an analysis of the court's actu-
al application of its "occurrence" test.' Although the court made
145. 629 A.2d at 883.
146. Id. at 884.
147. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
148. 629 A.2d at 880.
149. Id. at 882.
150. See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
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liberal use of regulatory intervention evidence relating to the fourth
"occurrence" factor, this evidence was found to be significant only
as a means to infer violations of the fundamental second and third
"occurrence" factors. While the lengthy duration of the discharges
by Morton's predecessors was mentioned, the court's reliance on
this factor appeared rather insubstantial. The language of the fifth
"occurrence" factor was unraveled to reveal that the issue raised by
this consideration was simply a rephrasing of the inquires necessi-
tated by the fundamental second and third "occurrence" factors.
Thus, the only "occurrence" factor invoked by the court which
could not be traced back to the two fundamental factors was that
pertaining to duration of discharge.'52
It should be remembered that the facts presented by the Morton
case represent an extremely flagrant bout of polluting activity; all
five of the "occurrence" factors were found to have been violated.
However, the court gave no indication that an insured who trans-
gressed less than all, even substantially less than all, of the five
factors would not be found to have expected or intended injury.
Indeed, the court's heavy reliance on the two fundamental factors
strongly suggests that a showing adverse to the insured regarding
these considerations may be sufficient to bar coverage under the
"occurrence" test. Thus, to the extent that the conclusions drawn in
this section tend to indicate that an insured who "merely" inten-
tionally discharges a known pollutant in violation of the second
and third "occurrence" factors and the Morton pollution-exclusion
criteria will be found to have expected or intended to cause injury,
it appears that the latter standard is "merged" into the former.
D. The Morton Court Shows Its Hand
1. Rationale for the Subjective "Occurrence" Test
Other factors also support the "merger" theory. First, the Morton
court purported to adopt the objective multi-factored "occurrence"
analysis precisely because it feared that a test which looked solely
to the insured's subjective expectation or intent to injure would
wrongfully allow intentional dischargers of known pollutants to
demand coverage under the standard CGL policy. The court ex-
pressed the reasoning as follows:
[W]e acknowledge the impracticality of adherence to the
152. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
298 [Vol. 44:265
MORTON INT'L, INC. v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INS. CO.
general rule that "we will look to the insured's subjective
intent to determine intent to injure." Although insureds may
concede that pollutants-even known pollutants-had been
intentionally discharged, those insureds are virtually certain
to insist that the resultant harm was unintended and unex-
pected."
Thus, the Morton court found, an objective "occurrence" test was
necessary which would allow insurers to bypass the difficult task
of establishing subjective intent or expectation to injure and deny
coverage for flagrant polluters. 54 Indeed, as the passage quoted
above reveals, 55 the court used the example of the intentional
discharger of known pollutants as a paradigm for the type of unac-
ceptable behavior which necessitated a more subjective and cover-
age-restrictive "occurrence" analysis. Through negative implication,
therefore, the quoted language asserts the court's belief that a sub-
jective "occurrence" test is fundamentally flawed in that it would
often fall to preclude coverage; due solely to evidentiary deficien-
cies, for highly culpable classes of insureds such as intentional
dischargers of known pollutants.
2. A Capitulation of the "Merger" Theory?
In addition, the Morton court appears to have explicitly conced-
ed at least the rough equivalence of the "occurrence" analysis and
the new pollution-exclusion clause standard in support of our
"merger" theory. During its resolution of the "occurrence" issue,
the court reviewed the facts of the case which demonstrated intent
to discharge and knowledge of the harmful nature of the effluent
released on the part of Morton's predecessors.'56 As support for
its conclusion that prior operators at the Berry's Creek plant had
expected to cause injury within the meaning of the occurrence
clause, the Morton court cited with approval the decisional weight
of a substantial body of existing case law: "Many courts have
concluded under comparable circumstances that continued discharg-
es of pollutants over a prolonged period, combined with knowledge
of the pollutants' deleterious qualities, is sufficient to establish an
intention or expectation that environmental damage will occur."'57
153. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co.. 629 A.2d 831, 879 (N.J. 1993)
(citation omitted).
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying note 153.
156. See supra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
157. 629 A.2d at 884. For a detailed review of pre-Morton cases which found insured
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The court immediately buttressed the persuasive impact of the
quoted proposition with a string of cites to cases decided in a vari-
ety of jurisdictions.
Quite revealingly, the cited language indicates that the court
believed that an insured who has intentionally discharged'
known pollutants over a prolonged period of time must be deemed
to have expected or intended the damage which results from his
actions. Therefore, we can safely assume that, in the Morton
court's view, an insured's simple violation of "occurrence" factors
one, two and three should in all cases be sufficient to bar coverage
under the "occurrence" clause. Moreover, the court's statement 59
can be converted into an admission that the pollution-exclusion
standard is merged within the "occurrence" analysis. Admittedly, it
is vexing to decide whether the cited language can be construed as
establishing a prima facie case for the "occurrence" analysis com-
prised of the first three "occurrence" factors. Indeed, for whatever
reason, it is very difficult to find a pre-Morton case interpreting
the "occurrence" clause which does not involve an extended pattern
of polluting activity. Perhaps the costs to the insurer of challenging
an insured's claim through litigation are prohibitively high in all
but the most severe cases. Presumably, pollution-caused damages
are more extensive, and hence more costly, in instances involving
multiple discharges 'spanning a number of years. In any event, al-
though the language cited above"6 provides convincing evidence
that an insured will be denied coverage upon the mere
transgression of "occurrence" factors one through three, we have no
clear indication as to how the court might alter its ruling in an
identical case, save for the absence of a prolonged history of pol-
luting activity. However, our earlier discussions formulated a hypo-
thetical which illustrated the irrationality of allowing an insured
who has only intentionally discharged a known pollutant to claim
coverage under the occurrence clause, yet disallowing coverage for
the same insured who has also discharged over a prolonged period
expectation or intent to injure based on the intentional discharge of known pollutants, see
infra note 177.
158. Although the court does not explicitly refer to an intentional discharge in the pas-
sage above, see supra note 157, the context in which passage is advanced makes clear
that the court was indeed speaking to the situation in which pollutants are willfully re-
leased. See 629 A.2d at 884.
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:265
MORTON INT'4 INC. v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INS. CO.
of time.' We concluded that the third "occurrence" factor could
not logically be held dispositive of the two cases. Thus, it seems
likely that a court faced with a short-term intentional discharger of
known pollutants would be willing to set aside the significance of
the "duration of discharge" factor. Should our analysis prove
sound, the Morton "occurrence" test will have been effectively
merged into the court's pollution-exclusion standard.
3. Parallel Applications
Finally, the apparent equivalency of the "occurrence" test and
the pollution-exclusion clause standard is perhaps most identifiable
in the Morton court's application of the facts to these issues. More
specifically, the facts used by the court to resolve each inquiry
were, for all intents and purposes, identical. In short, the court
surely could have disposed of both interpretive chores through a
single factual explication. Both analyses generated findings adverse
to the insured, with the support for each holding founded almost
exclusively upon evidence tending to show that Morton's predeces-
sors had ignored and evaded state officials, and continued to dis-
charge pollutants well after environmental authorities had warned
them of the danger attendant to their actions. 63 Truly, if the
Morton court had a distinction between the two standards in mind,
it is certainly not apparent from the language of the opinion.
The conclusions drawn from the language of the Morton opin-
ion in the sections above are not purely academic. It should be re-
membered that, even under the Morton test, the resolution of the
"occurrence" issue is essentially a weighing process in which "spe-
cific facts and circumstances inevitably determine whether courts
conclude that proof of an occurrence has been established."'"
Consequently, future courts are still likely to be guided, as they
had been before Morton, primarily by a common sense application
of facts to the "expectation or intent to injure" standard. One com-
mentator has summarized the traditional matter-of-fact judicial
approach to "occurrence" clause interpretation thusly:
The courts frequently look to the quality of the underlying
conduct where constructive intent is not readily apparent. If
161. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 167.
163. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 880-84 (NJ.
1993).
164. Id. at 884.
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the insured takes reasonable precautions to prevent possible
damage or acts promptly to remedy and prevent the reoc-
currence of actual damage after its discovery, the courts
have been inclined to find that the damage is unintentional
and caused by accident. Conversely, coverage is generally
denied when an insured takes no steps to avoid conduct
which has a high risk of causing damage. 65
Indeed, the Morton court itself relied on several past cases which
had denied coverage for insureds intentionally discharging known
pollutants under the expectation or intent to cause injury inqui-
ry."' Future courts applying the Morton "occurrence" test will
find no explicit caveat in the opinion which would lead them to
diverge from this line of precedent. In fact, in light of our previous
discussions, the language of the decision is likely to encourage
such findings. 67
165. Robert D. Chesler et al., Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage
for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9, 23 (1986).
166. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
167. Not suiprisingly, the conclusions drawn in the preceding sections initially appear to
have been confirmed by the first available case decided under the Morton opinion. In
Mottolo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 830 F. Supp. 658 (D. N.H. 1993), the insureds had
been charged by federal officials with dumping large quantities of hazardous wastes in a
hidden site. After investigations by both New Hampshire and federal agencies, it was
determined that the site contained approximately 1650 drums of toxic, flammable, corro-
sive, irritant and explosive liquid waste which had been compacted by bulldozers and
partially buried. Id. at 659. Consequently, many of the drums were punctured, leaking,
crushed or disfigured. Id.
Judge DeClerico encountered little difficulty in finding that the "damages did not
arise from an 'occurrence,"' id. at 665, and thus that, although the insurers raised a de-
fense to coverage based on the pollution-exclusion clause, "the court need not address
these arguments." Id. at 659 n.2. Such a result is clearly consistent with the "merger"
theory advanced in the text above. See supra note 110. The Mottolo court began its anal-
ysis by acknowledging the "occurrence" test which had recently been established by the
Morton court. Beginning with the "duration of discharge" factor, the court found that the
insured's discharges had continued over a four-year period. 830 F. Supp. at 664. Note
that this time period is considerably shorter than the more than twenty-year pattern of
polluting activity apparent in the Morton case, and indeed ranks as one of the shortest
histories of pollutant discharges in any pollution-exclusion case on record. To the extent
that the Mottolo court found expectation to injure despite a relatively brief bout of pollut-
ing on the part of the insured, our earlier arguments which suggested that a post-Morton
court would be willing to deny coverage regardless of the duration of discharge where the
insured had also intentionally discharged a known pollutant, see supra notes 158-62 and
accompanying text, are at least partially validated.
Next, the Mottolo court found that the insured had intentionally discharged known
pollutants in violation of the second and third Morton "occurrence" factors. 830 F. Supp.
at 664. While the court also held that the fifth factor had been violated, id. at 664-65,
we have recognized that a finding adverse to the insured under this element constitutes a
[Vol. 44:265
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E. The Impact of the Morton Decision
At this point, we have marshalled a great deal of evidence which
strongly suggests that an insured who intentionally discharges a
known pollutant will be always be denied coverage under the Mor-
ton court's "occurrence" test. Thus, since the threshold coverage
issue under the CGL policy is embodied in the occurrence
clause,168  and since the Morton court's pollution-exclusion stan-
dard also erects a barrier to coverage for insureds who have simply
intentionally discharged known pollutants,169 the latter inquiry can
be viewed as having been merged within the "occurrence" test. In
other words, any insured exhibiting less culpability than the situa-
tion in which an intentional discharge of a known pollutant has
occurred will certainly survive the pollution-exclusion standard, and
coverage will be contingent upon the outcome of the "occurrence"
analysis. However, any insured exhibiting full culpability with
regard to polluting activity, i.e., intentional discharge of a known
pollutant, will be precluded from coverage under the "occurrence"
test before the court has reason to reach a determination under the
mere semantic recapitulation of the findings already established through the analysis of the
"fundamental" second and third "occurrence" factors. See supra notes 121-30 and accom-
panying text. In fact, the Mottolo court realized the virtual equivalence of the two inqui-
ries by essentially treating the second and fifth "occurrence" factors as a single consider-
ation: "Mottolo had both objective and subjective knowledge of the harmful propensities
of the discharged materials." 830 F. Supp. at 664. The "harmful propensities" language is
taken from the second "occurrence" factor, but the "subjective" aspect is derived from the
fifth. Thus, the Mottolo court simply combined the two, dropping the "possibility or likeli-
hood of harm" language of the fifth factor, see supra text accompanying note 106, as
redundant in light of the "harmful propensities" language of the second factor, see supra
text accompanying note 106. This is precisely the interpretation we have already attributed
to the combined impact of these factors. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
Finally, the Mottolo court found that the insured's conduct had not violated the
"regulatory intervention" factor because "plaintiffs had ceased their dumping at the site
before officials discovered the contamination." 830 F. Supp. at 665. The court's finding of
expectation to cause damage despite the absence of this fourth "occurrence" factor greatly
supports our previous hypothetical discussions in which we could discern no logical justi-
fication for denying coverage to an insured who intentionally discharged a known pollut-
ant in disregard of the warnings of regulatory officials, but not to an insured who had
"merely" intentionally discharged a known pollutant. See supra notes 118-21 and accompa-
nying text. In sum, the Mottolo application of the Morton "occurrence" test goes a long
way toward bolstering the validity of the "merger" theory. A finding of expectation to in-
jure was rendered in a case involving the intentional discharge of known pollutants, not-
withstanding the absence of a "regulatory intervention" violation, the comparatively weak
"duration of discharge" evidence, and the presence of facts which naturally and necessarily
established the perpetually redundant fifth factor.
168. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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pollution-exclusion clause. In either case, the question raised by the
pollution-exclusion standard will be moot. As a result, future courts
applying the Morton decision will never have occasion to visit the
pollution-exclusion clause issue.
1. The Morton Court Hides the Ball
Notwithstanding, the reader might question the significance of our
conclusions. Recall that before Morton, courts in New Jersey and
other jurisdictions treated the pollution-exclusion clause as merely
restating the limits on coverage imposed by the "occurrence" lan-
guage of the CGL policy. 7 ' Indeed, the Broadwell case largely
typified this approach. Thus, the coverage issue in all pre-Morton
cases turned upon the "occurrence" issue, i.e., whether the insured
had expected or intended to cause damage.'' We have now rec-
ognized that, due to the perceived "merger" of the Morton "occur-
rence" test and the pollution-exclusion standard, the Morton opinion
simply constitutes a relatively convoluted affirmation of the pollu-
tion-exclusion clause interpretation adopted by Broadwell and simi-
lar cases.7 The sole relevant coverage consideration after Morton
remains, as it was before Morton, whether the insured expected or
intended to cause injury. Consequently, the ultimate impact of the
case may appear rather benign.
However, there is one major distinguishing factor between
Morton and the Broadwell line of cases. The Broadwell case at
least possessed the virtue of presenting the legal community with a
candid admission regarding the insignificant status to which the
pollution-exclusion clause was to be relegated as a consequence of
the court's holding. In Broadwell, the New Jersey Appellate Court
explicitly stated: "[D]ecisional law in New Jersey and elsewhere
has tended to interpret the pollution exclusion ... exception, as
'simply a restatement of the definition of 'occurrence'-that is, that
the policy will cover claims where the injury was 'neither expected
nor intended.' . . . We agree with this analysis.'. 73 In contrast,
170. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 93-170 and accompanying text.
173. Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 85 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); see also Chesler et al., supra note 165, at 43 ('The principal
consequence of [the Broadwell line of cases] is that the coverage issue has returned to
the question of whether the pollution damage was unintended and unexpected from the
standpoint of the insured, notwithstanding the pollution exclusion clause.").
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the Morton court has seemingly "hidden the ball" from state insur-
ers and insureds. The court explicitly overruled Broadwell "to the
extent that it holds that the standard pollution-exclusion clause
should be understood merely to impose the same conditions on
coverage as are imposed by the definition of 'occurrence,'
.... ," Thus, the court specifically intended to convey the idea
that the Broadwvell interpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause
was unacceptable. More importantly, the cited language amounts to
a pronouncement by the court that its new pollution-exclusion
standard is substantially different from that of Broadwell. Were this
not so, there would be no need to overrule the clear weight of
precedent. However, we have already recognized that this represen-
tation is false; the ultimate impact of Morton is a simple re-affir-
mation of the Broadwell approach.
Furthermore, at several points in the opinion, the Morton court
took great pains to emphasize the distinction it perceived between
the Broadwell and Morton pollution-exclusion standards:
[The standard pollution-exclusion clause ... will be con-
strued to provide coverage identical with that provided
under the prior occurrence-based policy, except that the
clause will be interpreted to preclude coverage in cases in
which the insured intentionally discharges a known pol-
lutant, irrespective of whether the resultant property dam-
age was intended or expected.75
The language cited above suggests the court's belief that it was
adopting a more coverage-restrictive interpretation of the pollution-
exclusion clause than had existed under Broadwell in two important
respects. First, the Broadwell line of cases was to be abandoned to
the extent that these decisions failed to bar coverage under the pol-
lution-exclusion clause for insureds who intentionally discharged
known pollutants. However, as suggested previously, 76  the
Broadwell precedents erected a standard under which coverage was
in fact often barred for intentional dischargers of known pollut-
ants.1 77 Therefore, pre-Morton case law already provided a means
174. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 847 (N.J. 1993).
175. Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
176. See supra notes 156, 166 and accompanying text.
177. Although pre-Morton cases did not always explicitly announce the conclusion that
the simple intentional discharge of a known pollutant would automatically serve to estab-
lish insured expectation or intent to injure, such a holding was certainly inferable from
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the language of the opinions. The relevant cases each relied to varying degrees upon
some combination of the factual elements later codified by the Morton "occurrence" analy-
sis, see supra text accompanying note 106. However, the critical elements common to the
courts' findings of expectation or intent to injure always focused on the reality that the
insured had intentionally discharged a known pollutant. As in Morton, any other facts
considered appeared to be viewed as extraneous vehicles useful as a means to establish
this core inquiry. See supra notes 130-52 and accompanying text. The decisions abstracted
below all can be viewed as being guided by the principle that: "The chemical manufactur-
er or industrial enterprise who discharges, disburses or deposits hazardous waste material
knowing, or who may have been expected to know, that it would pollute, will be exclud-
ed from coverage. ... Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Indus. Lab. Corp., 883 F.2d 1092 (1st Cir. 1989),
the insured operated an electroplating business, in the course of which he repeatedly dis-
charged untreated chemical wastes containing cyanide, acids, nickel, aluminum and zinc
into the public water supply. Id. at 1093. Repeatedly admonished by Massachusetts state
officials to cease and correct his hazardous activities, the insured nevertheless continued.
In finding intent to cause harm, the court found that the insured had "'repeatedly and
knowingly' released hazardous materials into the environment .... " Id. at 1099. More-
over, the Travelers court observed that the insured "was a chemical engineer. He must
have known of the corrosive effect of acids, caustics and cyanides." Id.
In Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st
Cir. 1984), the insured operated a barrel reconditioning business. Toxic wastes cleansed
from barrels by the company were knowingly deposited and discharged into the ground,
eventually finding their way into the local groundwater supply. Id. at 33. The Great
Lakes court held: "The government has alleged that Great Lakes is liable because pollu-
tion and contamination of the soil, surface and subsurface waters has taken place as a
concomitant of its regular business activity .... There is no 'occurrence' within the
meaning of the policy. ... Id.
In Mapco Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1454 (D.
Alaska 1991), the insured was a crude oil refinery which regularly experienced spills of
petroleum products. However, the company had established a system of underground con-
crete sumps for the collection of the pollutants. Without the insured's knowledge, the
sumps cracked and leaked, eventually contaminating local groundwater with benzene. Id. at
1456. Although the insured knew of the harmful qualities of the discharged materials, the
Mapco court apparently refused to find expectation or intent to injure for the sole reason
that the discharges were not intentional: "There is no evidence that [the insured] expected
or intended for the various spill recovery systems to fall and cause the resultant damage
to the groundwater. Absent such evidence, summary judgment on this issue is denied." Id.
at 1460.
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Meenan Oil Co., 755 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1991),
the insured was an oil storage and distribution company. Groundwater contamination after
the insured's underground storage system began to leak. However, the company was well
aware of the discharges which were occurring and both state officials and corporate em-
ployees insisted that the problem be addressed. Id. at 550-53. The insured took no reme-
dial action. In finding expectation to cause injury, based implicitly on the intentional
discharge of known pollutants, the court stated: "[The insured] knew that its system
leaked, that it had always leaked, and that it would continue to leak . . . . [The insured]
was aware of the . . . imminent threat of an environmental incident." Id. at 553.
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich.
1990), one of the insureds was a manufacturer of automobile parts. The company's manu-
facturing processes generated various solid and liquid wastes which were then discharged
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into a nearby brook. Despite extensive knowledge gained from independent chemical engi-
neers regarding the potential consequences, id. at 1351-53, the insured's polluting activity
continued unabated. The court easily found expectation to cause damage, noting that the
insured had knowledge of the harmful nature of the substances it was discharging into the
environment: "Test results showed the presence of volatile suspended solids indicating
chemical contamination." Id. at 1351. The court also found an intent to discharge: "[The
insured] knew that contaminated liquid wastes were flowing into the [brook] . . . and
continued to discharge contaminants into the environment." Id. at 1352.
In Acolac, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Md.
1989), the insured operated a chemical plant in Missouri. Discharges of wastes eventually
made nearby residents ill from systemic chemical intoxication. Id. at 1542. Clearly rec-
ognizing the insured's intentional discharge of known pollutants, the court found expecta-
tion to cause damage, stating: "[W]hen pollutants regularly have escaped over a period of
years, especially when management was either deliberately indifferent to the situation or
consciously disregarded it, coverage is excluded under the policy definition of 'occur-
rence,' because damage is to be expected with a substantial degree of probability." Id. at
1544 (citation omitted).
In American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan.
1987), landowners proximate to the insured's salt company brought suit, alleging that
careless operation of the plant had resulted in the release of tons of salt brine into the
environment, hence rendering a local aquifer unfit for irrigation purposes. Id. at 1425.
Implicitly basing its finding of expectation to cause injury on the intentional discharge of
a known pollutant, the court held: "[D]efendants knew that their operation ... was re-
sulting in considerable salt pollution. Complaints were received from landowners and state
agencies to that effect. . . . To argue that the damage resulting from defendants' dis-
charge of salt was unexpected ... is unsupportable." Id. at 1430 (citation omitted).
In American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neville Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Pa.
1987), the defendant insured owned and operated a chemical manufacturing facility. Dis-
charges by the company eventually contaminated and altered the groundwater supply, and
such releases of contaminants continued after the insured had been notified of the deleteri-
ous character of its activities. Id. at 932-33. Finding expectation to cause damage based
on a clear recognition of the intentional discharge of known pollutants, the Neville court
found: "[Plaintiff] alleges that each time it discovered another contaminated well, [it] or
the Department of Environmental Resources notified [the insured] . . . .Despite this no-
tice, the complaint states 'Neville Chemical has continued to fail to prevent spills ...
and continued to dispose of chemical pollutants ...." Id.
In Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), the insured was a chemical manufacturing plant which
had caused substantial personal and property damage as the result of its release of
dioxins. Quickly dismissing the possibility that the insured had not expected or intended
to cause damage, the court noted that "Diamond's management knew of the hazardous
nature of dioxins at a relatively early stage." Id. at 462. Moreover, speaking to "intention-
al discharge" element, the court found that "[o]verwhelming evidence was presented that
Diamond knew about the release of dioxins from its plant and the migration of these
substances to surrounding areas." Id. at 463.
In County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. App.
Div.), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 614 (1989), the defendant insurer owned and operated a
landfill. Plaintiffs alleged that the dumping of chemical and industrial wastes at the site
had contaminated both soil and groundwater, resulting in personal and property damage.
In a stark acceptance of the concept that the intentional discharge of a known pollutant
cannot give rise to an "occurrence," the Broome court bluntly held: "Here, the evidence is
clear that [the insured] was well aware of the leakage problems and yet continued to
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to deny coverage for insureds meeting the culpability requirements
of the new pollution-exclusion standard, and the adoption of this
test was unnecessary. As a result, it appears that the "concession"
supposedly embodied in the Morton court's pollution-exclusion
standard, the barring of coverage for intentional dischargers of
known pollutants, actually provides no new benefit to insurers.
Second, in the language quoted above,' the court touted the
new pollution-exclusion standard as relieving the pre-existing bur-
den on insurers to show insured expectation or intent to cause in-
jury in order to deny coverage; a mere showing of the intentional
discharge of a known pollutant would now suffice. However, as we
have seen, the two inquiries are essentially two sides of the same
coin. Since the Morton pollution-exclusion standard raises an issue
which will always first be capable of resolution under the court's
"occurrence" test,'79 when an insurer demonstrates that an insured
has intentionally discharged a known pollutant, he will also have
simultaneously shown insured expectation or intent to injure. Fur-
thermore, again recall that the Morton court itself noted a signifi-
cant body of prior case law from a wide array of jurisdictions
which reflected the common judicial view under Broadwell that the
intentional discharge of known pollutants was alone sufficient to
establish insured expectation or intent to cause harm." Thus,
whether evaluated in the context of the Broadwell or the Morton
approach, an insured who intentionally discharges a known pollut-
ant has always and will continue to be deemed to have expected or
intended to cause environmental injury under New Jersey law.
Consequently, the court's implicit assertion that an objective show-
ing of insured expectation or intent to injure is somehow more
burdensome to the insurer than a showing of the same insured's
intentional discharge of a known pollutant is simply untenable. The
"new approach" purportedly promulgated by the Morton court,
rooted in the idea that the revised pollution-exclusion standard will
serve as a boon to insurers, is illusory.
2. Uncertainty, Insolvency & the Plight of the Insurer
Thus, the Morton decision certainly sends conflicting messages
to legal counsel for insurers. While the excerpts from the opinion
permit the dumping." Id. at 623.
178. See supra text accompanying note 175.
179. See supra notes 93-170 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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provided in the preceding section evince the court's belief that a
clearly-defined distinction exists between the "occurrence" issue
and the new pollution-exclusion clause inquiry,' our earlier ex-
plication of the Morton opinion,' 2 as well as many pre-Morton
cases,13 have failed to pinpoint the nature of this elusive, and
perhaps fictitious, dichotomy. Future attorneys seeking to discern
the effect of the Morton case will encounter great difficulty in
attempting to reconcile the language quoted previously with the
parity between the two standards suggested by the court's own
resolution of the "occurrence" and pollution-exclusion clause issues.
The Morton court unquestionably appreciated the potential impact
of its rulings on the future of CGL policy interpretation in envi-
ronmental damage cases," so one cannot help but wonder why
the court did not make some concerted effort to draw an obvious
line for the sake of clarity. In any event, the diametrically-opposed
signals sent by the Morton decision certainly raise the possibility
of confusion.
Indeed, the New Jersey legal community may already have
received the wrong message. Immediately following the New Jersey
Supreme Court's disposition of the Morton case, lawyers, insurance
industry representatives, and legal commentators in the Garden
State began their attempts to quantify the future impact of the deci-
sion." On July 26, 1993, a mere five days after the Morton case
had been decided, the New Jersey Lawyer covered the court's
disposition of the case. In the article, Wendy L. Mager, attorney
for the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association, stated that
Morton "'is a more expansive interpretation of the exclusion that
had existed in New Jersey."" 86  Elliot Abrutyn, attorney for
GAIC, was similarly convinced that the Morton opinion "'is better
than Broadwell.' '' tn Abrutyn noted that "'[Morton] still gives the
insurance industry something .... The Broadwell case basically
181. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 93-170 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
184. See Morton Int'l. Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 834 (NJ.
1993) ("Because the policies are essentially standardized, industry-wide forms, our interpre-
tation of their coverage provisions may affect significantly the allocation of damages for
environmental pollution of New Jersey property among insurance carriers, industry, and
government.").
185. See Jeffrey Kanige, Court Narrows Pollution Exclusion, 134 NJ. L.J. 1053 (1993).
186. Rocco Cammarere, Intentional Polluters Cannot Use Insurance, 2 N.J LAWYER
1147 (1993).
187. Id. at 1162.
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emasculated the pollution exclusion clause.""" These statements
reflect a critical misunderstanding of what we have regarded as the
essential equivalence of the Morton and Broadwell pollution-exclu-
sion clause interpretations. Most alarmingly, John Tiene, spokesman
for the New Jersey Insurance News Service, claimed that "'[t]he
Morton case could potentially free up approximately $ 1 billion of
9~198insurance money ....
As Mr. Tiene's statement suggests, judicial opinions interpret-
ing CGL policy clauses influence the future predictions of insurers.
Consequently, if insurers are convinced that they have gained a
substantially increased degree of financial leeway as a result of the
Morton decision, operating capital derived from premiums may be
channelled into riskier investment opportunities. Insurers may also
conclude that, since Morton appears to ratify a more coverage-
restrictive interpretation of the pollution-exclusion clause, hence
decreasing the number of environmentally-related damage claims
they will be obliged to indemnify, they can safely set aside a re-
duced level of cash reserves. 9 However, we have recognized that
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Many commentators have addressed the impact of judicial policy interpretation on
the financial stability of insurers. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and
the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 942, 955 (1988) ("Insurers make their living
relying on the certainty afforded by the law of large numbers. To achieve that certainty,
insurers must assess the risk to their insureds posed by existing law and potential legal
changes."); Abraham, supra note 105, at 406 ("Because many of the expansions of tort
liability that have occurred during the past decade were not anticipated by insurers, they
have become wary of their ability to predict future expansion. . . .Insurance underwriters
have become highly distrustful of courts and juries."); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insur-
ance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 995, 1023 (1992) ("Courts also must consider the impact of their decisions on
insurer solvency. An obvious consequence of pro-insured rules is expansion of the
insurer's liability beyond that which the insurer assumed when the underwriting office
calculated the premium. This increased exposure necessarily impacts the solvency of the
insurer."); Frona M. Powell, Insuring Environmental Cleanup: Triggering Coverage for
Environmental Property Damage Under the Terms of a Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policy, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1194, 1224 (1992) ("The insurance industry is an
industry built on risk assessment. Until insurers can better identify and predict their poten-
tial liability for environmental damages under the CGL policy, expensive litigation over
the scope of liability under the CGL policies is sure to continue."); Joanna L. Johnson,
Comment, Whether Insurers Must Defend PRP Notifications: An Expensive Issue Compli-
cated by Conflicting Court Decisions, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 579, 595 (1990) ("In order
for the insurance system to function effectively, insurers must know the extent of the
risks being insured by their policies. . . . If policy language can be subsequently rede-
fined to expand coverage beyond what was planned by the insurer, then it nullifies the
original risk assessment."); Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The "Sudden and Accidental" Ex-
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such conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the language of
the Morton opinion; insurer expectations of more restrictive cover-
age will eventually meet head-on with the rational meaning which
will be attributed to the decision by future courts."1 Consistent
with our observations, insurers will find themselves no better off
under Morton than they had been under Broadwell because the
scope of coverage provided by the two approaches is identical.'"
Should these apprehensions be realized, New Jersey insurers will
face threats to solvency and some quantum of financial loss.'93
ception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Policies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REv. 161, 164
(1991) ("Judicial interpretation of policy language has a direct effect on an insurer's risk
of liability. If judicial construction of policy language is narrow, losses that must be cov-
ered by the insurer are more infrequent. If interpretation is broad and far-reaching, the
insurer's risk grows commensurately.").
The most influential and authoritative of these voices has certainly been University
of Virginia law professor Kefineth S. Abraham. Abraham notes that unbridled and liberal
judicial interpretations of policy language "undermine insurers' actuarial calculations,"
Abraham, supra, at 960, and work "like a mandatory retroactive price decrease." Id. at
961. Consequently, "[i]nsurers suffer an immediate financial loss ...." Id. Others have
noted the potential for related repercussions. See Powell, supra, at 1224-25 ("Ultimately,
industries may be unable to obtain liability insurance for activities that may expose them
to risk of environmental contamination. The result will be to deter many desirable busi-
ness activities. ... ); Johnson, supra, at 610-11 ("Because the [unforeseen] risks were
not spread among insureds, insurers have no prepared funds with which to address [envi-
ronmental] claims. Insurers must instead take the necessary funding from the same general
insurance pool that encompasses the insurers' other planned commitments."); Murphy, su-
pra, at 177 ("Insurers are left unable to rely on the language in their own policies. As a
result, insurers must either draft new language ...or drop coverage for a particular risk
from the policy entirely.").
Abraham recognizes with particular dismay the threats to insurer solvency created by
the "gutting" of the pollution-exclusion clause. Abraham, supra, at 961-65. This damaging
result was of course perpetrated by courts which have long read the limits of the clause
to be coextensive with the CGL policy definition of "occurrence." Therefore, insurers have
already felt the fiscal sting of the judicial gloss applied to the pollution-exclusion clause
through the Broadwell line of cases, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text, and
have presumably adjusted risk assessments accordingly. However, the danger of the Mor-
ton opinion is that it falsely suggests to insurers, due to the apparent merger of the Mor-
ton "occurrence" and pollution-exclusion standards, see supra notes 93-170 and accompa-
nying text, that the courts are now willing to take back some of the risk which they had
previously foisted upon the industry. The insult of Morton will be added to the injury of
Broadwell as over-zealous insurance industry officials respond gleefully to the empty
promise of a smaller risk pool. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. Thus, if
insurers truly fix actuarial predictions on the basis of changes in the law as Abraham and
other commentators suggest, then the Morton decision appears destined to raise further dif-
ficulties for already beleaguered underwriters.
191. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 190.
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Therefore, the fundamental shortcoming of the Morton decision is
its failure to clearly illustrate the practical distinction between the
pollution-exclusion standard it creates (intentional discharge of a
known pollutant), and the standard it overrules (insured expectation
or intent to injure)."9
194. The potentially misleading results of the Morton decision could perhaps have been
avoided, while still achieving the court's desired outcome, through the use of various
well-established insurance law principles. While the Morton court used the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine to interpret the pollution-exclusion clause as barring coverage for
insureds who had intentionally discharged known pollutants, see supra notes 70-76 and
accompanying text, a more lucid approach could have been formulated from the court's
additional observation" that 'where an insurer or its agent misrepresents . . . the coverage
of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or at the in-
ception of the contract, and the insured reasonably relies thereupon to his ultimate detri-
ment, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage .... "' Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255
A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1969), quoted in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629
A.2d 831, 873 (NJ. 1993). Based on this legal theory, and due to the perceived fraud
which had accompanied the insurance industry's representation of the pollution-exclusion
clause to state officials, the Morton court could arguably have refused to recognize the
effect of the exclusion altogether.
The clause might also have been invalidated by public policy considerations. See,
e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 934 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1991) (invalidating as contrary
to public policy embodied in a Pennsylvania statute an insurance clause providing for the
reduction of uninsured motorist coverage benefits). An insurance policy clause is generally
against public policy, and thus void, where it "dilutes or diminish[es] statutory provisions
applicable to the insurer's contract of insurance."); DC Elec., Inc. v. Employer's Modem
Life Co., 413 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). In Morton, the court found that to give
effect to the literal language of the fraudulently represented pollution-exclusion clause
would run contrary to state statutes authorizing the Commissioner of Insurance to deter-
mine the reasonableness of rates for insurance coverage.
Furthermore, since the Morton court found that state insureds were forced to accept
the inclusion of the pollution exclusion in CGL policies after the adoption of the clause
by state insurance regulators, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, garden-variety
adhesion contract interpretative principles might have been employed to neutralize the
coverage exception. See JERRY, supra note 71, § 25C, at 105 ("In the usual case, when a
contract is recognized as being 'adhesive,' courts are more active in policing the bargain
to counterbalance the potential detriment to the weaker parties."). In these ways, coverage
in the Morton case would have been made contingent upon the outcome of the "occur-
rence" test. The Morton court might then have achieved the goals of its pollution-exclu-
sion standard by holding that, as a matter of law, an insured's intentional discharge of
known pollutants in contravention of the second and third "occurrence" factors would in
all cases be sufficient to establish the insured's objective expectation or intent to cause
damage. To avoid confusion, the court might also have noted that many previous cases
had failed to find an "occurrence" under identical circumstances. See supra note 177.
Such an approach would have sent a clear message regarding the court's vision of what
type of polluting activity is not entitled to coverage and avoided the confusion which
inevitably resulted from the Morton court's misleading representation that more restrictive
coverage would ensue as a result of its decision, see supra notes 170-80 and accompany-
ing text. Insurers have already incurred substantial damages from the judicial emasculation
of the pollution-exclusion clause. See supra note 190. If the Morton court was unwilling
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Morton decision titularly restricted coverage for
environmentally-related damages, our analyses have shown that
things certainly are not as they seem. Before Mr. Tiene and his
colleagues deposit their $1 billion,"5 the ultimate impact of the
case should be carefully considered. Likewise, the variety of juris-
dictions which adhere to the New Jersey pollution-exclusion inter-
pretive schema should exercise similar prudence.
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to afford any substantive significance to the exclusion, it should at least have been forth-
coming regarding the actual coverage consequences created by its opinion.
Finally, the suggested approach would also have cured a "mootness" defect in the
Morton opinion. As we have noted, the "occurrence" inquiry is the threshold coverage
issue in any standard CGL policy. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. Since
the Morton court decided that the activities of the insureds did not constitute an "occur-
rence," coverage was barred and there was no reason for the court to proceed to address
the pollution-exclusion clause issue. See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Il. App. Ct.) ("[I]f there were no 'occur-
rence,' there would be no coverage in the first instance and it would be unnecessary to
reach the question whether the pollution exclusion clause applied."), appeal denied, 530
N.E.2d 246 (Il. 1988). Therefore, the pollution-exclusion issue in the Morton case was
"moot." See generally WILLIAM EATON, WHO KILLED THE CONSTITUTION? 163 (1988)
(discussing the 'ripeness' and 'mootness' doctrines in the context of constitutional law
adjudications).
195. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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